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An Emerging Uniformity for
International Law
David H. Moore*
Abstract
The status of international law in the U.S. legal system has been hotly con-
tested. Most international law scholars maintain that customary international
law ("CIL") is federal common law immediately applicable in federal courts.
A minority of scholars has responded that CIL may be applied by federal
courts only when authorized by the political branches. The Supreme Court's
decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), stoked the debate.
In Sosa's wake, scholars have overwhelmingly concluded that the Supreme
Court endorsed the majority view that CIL is federal common law.
This Article asserts that Sosa has been both misperceived and underap-
preciated. Sosa not only supports the minority position that federal judicial
authority to incorporate CIL hinges on congressional intent, but Sosa also
suggests that federal incorporation is governed by the same considerations that
determine whether treaties are self-executing and immediately applicable in
U.S. courts: namely, the intent of the political branches, specific definition,
mutuality, practical consequences, foreign relations effects, and alternative
means of enforcement. Sosa thus manifests the emergence of a uniform doc-
trine that governs the federal status of both treaties and CIL. This emerging
doctrine, which serves to police the distribution of lawmaking and foreign af-
fairs authority between the judiciary and the political branches, has significant
implications. It suggests that the reigning confusion over the domestic status
of international law is being replaced with doctrinal clarity and coherence,
reveals that the collective wisdom on the domestic status of international law is
out of step with Supreme Court jurisprudence, results in more appropriate
treatment of CIL relative to treaties, and indicates that efforts to incorporate
international law as federal law should focus on the political branches, not the
courts.
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Introduction
The status of international law in the U.S. legal system has long
been murky.1 Debate over the issue has reached a feverish pitch in
recent years.2 Scholars have clashed over such issues as whether cus-
tomary international law ("CIL")3 is federal or state law and whether
CIL may be applied by federal courts absent incorporating
legislation.4
1 See Ralph G. Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt Critique to Rest: Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain and the Future of International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 2241, 2243 (2004) (referring to the "decades-old battles over the constitutional status of
international law"); Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary International Law,
42 VA. J. INT'L L. 365, 367-68 (2002) (noting that the debate over the domestic status of custom-
ary international law was precipitated by the Supreme Court's 1938 decision in Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), as well as increases in both the scope of international law and
litigation based on it in the latter 1900s). See generally Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of
Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665 (1985); Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive
Branch and International Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1205 (1988); Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State
Authority, and the Preemptive Power of International Law, 1994 Sup. CT. REV. 295; A.M. Weis-
burd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1995).
2 See Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional Ap-
proach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 Sup. CT. REV. 153, 153-54; Young, supra note 1, at 366.
3 CIL is traditionally defined as the "general and consistent practice of states followed by
them from a sense of legal obligation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987); see also Statute of the International Court of Jus-
tice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 [hereinafter Statute of the International Court of
Justice], available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm
(identifying "general [state] practice accepted as law" as a source of international law).
4 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Fed-
eral Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997) [hereinaf-
ter Bradley & Goldsmith, CIL as Federal Common Law] (arguing that CIL is not federal
common law and must be incorporated by the political branches before it may be applied as a
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Recently, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,5 the Supreme Court
stepped into the debate, commenting on the meaning of the Alien
Tort Statute ("ATS"), 6 a Founding-era jurisdictional statute that has
been used to bring suits based on CIL in federal courts.7 The Court
concluded that federal courts may recognize certain common-law
causes of action based on CIL under the ATS. 8 In the wake of this
decision, scholars have begun to discuss Sosa's import for the status of
CIL in federal courts.9 However, many have failed to recognize what
Sosa suggests about the status of international law in federal courts
more generally.
CIL is one of two primary sources of international law; treaties
constitute the other.10 In Sosa, the Supreme Court-without acknowl-
edging it, and perhaps unknowingly-started to close a circle the
Court began to draw nearly two hundred years ago when it adopted
rule of decision by federal courts); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?,
111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998) (defending the traditional position that CIL is federal law sub-
ject to common-law incorporation by federal courts); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
Federal Courts and the Incorporation of International Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2260 (1998) (re-
plying to Professor Koh); Curtis A. Bradley, The Status of Customary International Law in U.S.
Courts-Before and After Erie, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 807 (1998); Curtis A. Bradley &
Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 319 (1997); Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing: Interna-
tional Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (1997); Gerald L.
Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors
Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land:
Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393 (1997);
Young, supra note 1.
5 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). The facts of Sosa are discussed in con-
junction with this Article's analysis of Sosa's reasoning. See infra Part III.
6 Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). The ATS currently provides: "The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." Id.
7 While the ATS had largely gone unnoticed since its inclusion in the original Judiciary
Act of 1789, the Second Circuit's 1980 decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
1980), brought the ATS out of obscurity and opened the door for federal courts to hear suits by
aliens based on violations of CIL. A variety of such suits were brought following Filartiga. See,
e.g., Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 978
(9th Cir. 2003), and district court opinion vacated en banc, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005); Bigio v.
Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440 (2d Cir. 2000); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996);
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411 (9th Cir.
1995); In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994).
8 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724-25.
9 See infra Part I.
10 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 3, at art. 38; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 (1987).
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the self-execution doctrine for treaties." In Sosa, the Court suggested
that questions as to whether treaties and CIL may be applied as rules
of decision by federal courts are governed by the same doctrine. This
Article identifies the emergence of this doctrine and discusses its
implications.
Part I provides context for this discussion by briefly recounting
the debate regarding the domestic status of international law both
prior to and following Sosa. As this Part reveals, the academic discus-
sion of Sosa has failed to recognize the apparent emergence of a uni-
form approach to the federal status of treaties and CIL. Part II
provides the backdrop for perceiving this emerging doctrine by outlin-
ing the analysis courts employ to determine whether treaties may be
invoked as rules of decision in U.S. courts. Against this background,
Part III analyzes the Court's opinion in Sosa, identifying the test the
Supreme Court developed for determining when CIL may be applied
as federal law in federal courts. Part IV renders explicit what Parts II
and III suggest: that the same doctrine that governs the status of trea-
ties also governs the status of CIL in federal courts. Part IV identifies
the substance of this doctrine and provides a brief discussion of its
implications, opening the door for scholarly debate on this emerging,
and surely controversial, doctrine.
L Debate over the Status of International Law in Federal Courts
As noted, the status of international law in the U.S. legal system
has long been contested. The debate has been somewhat less feverish
with regard to treaties than with CIL. The question of whether trea-
ties may be applied in U.S. courts as federal law has, at some level,
been addressed by the Constitution and the self-execution doctrine. 12
Scholars have criticized the concept of non-self-execution, however,
arguing that it is inconsistent with treaties' status as supreme federal
11 See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1828), overruled in part by United States v.
Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
12 See infra Part II. This is not to suggest that the doctrine itself is clear, see Carlos Manuel
Vdzquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695, 695 (1995) (not-
ing that the distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties "is a matter of
some controversy and much confusion"), but that the doctrine governs the questions of whether
and when treaties may be applied by U.S. courts as federal law. If a treaty is found to be self-
executing, then it is immediately applicable by U.S. courts, whereas a non-self-executing treaty
requires implementing legislation before plaintiffs may enforce the substance of its terms. See
infra note 35 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 75:1
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law, and they have challenged the political branches' practice of at-
taching non-self-execution declarations to the ratification of treaties.13
A minority of scholars has sought to defend non-self-execution.14
By contrast, the status of CIL in federal courts has remained un-
certain as a matter of doctrine. 5 Broad references by the Supreme
Court to international law's domestic status have failed to supply clear
guidance,16 and lower courts have treated CIL as federal common law
13 See, e.g., Malvina Halberstam, Alvarez-Machain II: The Supreme Court's Reliance on
the Non-Self-Executing Declaration in the Senate Resolution Giving Advice and Consent to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 89, 92,
95-107, 110-11 (2005) (disputing, even after Sosa, the constitutionality of non-self-execution
declarations attached to otherwise self-executing treaties); Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Trea-
ties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760, 760 (1988) (asserting that the self-execution doctrine "is a judicially
invented notion that is patently inconsistent with" the Supremacy Clause); David Sloss, Non-
Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1, 6-7, 14-16,
45-73 (2002) (challenging the Restatement's position on self-execution as inconsistent with the
Constitution); Carlos M. V~zquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2156-58,
2169-88, 2191-92, 2214 (1999) (arguing that both a broad concept of non-self-execution and
non-self-execution declarations are inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause, while nonetheless
accepting the validity of non-self-execution declarations); John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Con-
stitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955,
1959-60, 1979-81, 1983 (1999) (summarizing the position of the self-execution doctrine's critics).
14 See Yoo, supra note 13; John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and
Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218 (1999). For responses to
Professor Yoo's position, see Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original
Understanding, and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land," 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (1995);
V~izquez, supra note 13.
15 But cf Koh, supra note 4, at 1824-27, 1830-41 (arguing that federal courts' incorpora-
tion of CIL as federal common law has been the established practice at least since the U.S.
founding).
16 See, for example, the famous statement in The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900),
that "[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are
duly presented for their determination." Id. at 700. For divergent views on the import of The
Paquete Habana, see Ku & Yoo, supra note 2, at 172-73 (arguing that "if anything, [The Paquete
Habana] undermine[s] the idea that federal courts have power to enforce CIL as federal law");
Young, supra note 1, at 451 (noting, inter alia, that international law was part of general common
law when The Paquete Habana was decided); Ernest A. Young, It's Just Water: Toward the Nor-
malization of Admiralty, 35 J. MAR. L. & COM. 469, 519 (2004) (same); Bradley & Goldsmith,
CIL as Federal Common Law, supra note 4, at 849-50 (same); JOHN M. ROGERS, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND UNITED STATES LAW 135-39 (1999) ("[I]nternational law is part of our law...
in the same way that 'justice' or 'fairness' or 'sound policy' is a part of our law.... [Ilt forms the
basis for decision when no other dispositive source controls."); Koh, supra note 4, at 1830-41
(citing The Paquete Habana to support the contention that "[bloth before and after Erie, the
federal courts issued rulings construing the law of nations"). See also Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Note,
Rethinking Early Judicial Involvement in Foreign Affairs: An Empirical Study of the Supreme
Court's Docket, 114 YALE L.J. 855, 858-60, 865-66 (2005) (noting selective scholarly reliance on
prior cases to support divergent views of the courts' role in foreign affairs).
The George Washington Law Review [Vol. 75:1
for some purposes but not others.17 Scholars have likewise split on the
issue.
Prior to Sosa, the prevailing view was that CIL was applicable in
federal courts as federal common law without a need for incorpora-
tion by the political branches. 18 Professor Koh, for example, argued
that "[o]nce customary norms have sufficiently crystallized, courts
should presumptively incorporate them into federal common law, un-
less the norms have been ousted as law for the United States by con-
trary federal directives." 19 This view was challenged by a minority of
scholars who claimed that CIL should not qualify as federal common
law post-Erie,20 and thus could not provide a federal2l rule of decision
absent incorporation by the political branches.22 The crux of the mi-
nority position was that the political branches must take the lead in
rendering CIL domestic law. While other views were advanced, 23
17 "Although the lower federal courts have endorsed the [majority] position, they have
done so mostly in jurisdictional contexts and have not generally considered its broader substan-
tive implications"; for example, courts generally have not found that CIL binds the President,
nor have they held that CIL is supreme over state law. Bradley & Goldsmith, CIL as Federal
Common Law, supra note 4, at 821, 845 & n.199, 851, 873; see also Young, supra note 1, at 379,
381-84 (explaining that although some courts have endorsed the view that CIL is federal com-
mon law for purposes of arising-under jurisdiction, generally courts have not adopted the view
that CIL trumps inconsistent state law as federal common law would).
18 Bradley & Goldsmith, CIL as Federal Common Law, supra note 4, at 816-17, 820; Koh,
supra note 4, at 1824-26, 1835 & n.61, 1841; Young, supra note 1, at 375. CIL as common law
would trump state law and create arising-under jurisdiction. See, e.g., id. at 377-78.
19 Koh, supra note 4, at 1835.
20 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
21 State incorporation of CIL would provide a state rule of decision for federal courts
sitting in diversity. See Bradley & Goldsmith, CIL as Federal Common Law, supra note 4, at
870.
22 See id. at 817, 870; Koh, supra note 4, at 1840 n.84; Young, supra note 1, at 369, 463-64
& n.505.
23 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, International Law, Sovereignty, and American Constitu-
tionalism: Reflections on the Customary International Law Debate, 98 AM. J. Irr'L L. 91, 97
(2004) (advancing a view of CIL "as nonpreemptive, nonfederal law .... to which federal courts
would look when seized of jurisdiction and considering a case in which international law norms
might be applied"); Michael D. Ramsey, International Law as Non-preemptive Federal Law, 42
VA. J. INr'L L. 555, 558 (2002) ("suggest[ing] that international law be treated as non-preemptive
federal law"); ROGERS, supra note 16, at 139-68 (arguing that federal courts may apply CIL to
preempt state-law violations of international law where (a) there is no federal statute authorizing
the violation, (b) the federal government would have power to legislate that the state comply
with international law, and (c) the executive agrees, and the court confirms, that the relevant
norm of CIL binds the United States); Young, supra note 1, at 370-71, 467-68 (advocating a
return to CIL's pre-Erie status as general law that would make CIL available to both federal and
state courts pursuant to conflict-of-law principles); Young, supra note 16, at 507-09 (same); id. at
471, 517 (arguing that foreign affairs law ought to be normalized, i.e., that we should "[aiccept
broad legislative authority [in the area of foreign affairs], but insist that federal [foreign affairs]
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these two framed the discussion. Each raised persuasive arguments; 24
neither was the clear winner.2 5
Sosa provided additional fodder for the debate between the two
positions. In Sosa's wake, commentators have tended to conclude
that the Supreme Court vindicated the majority position that federal
courts possess the authority to incorporate CIL as federal common
law even in the absence of congressional authorization.
2 6
law be made according to constitutionally prescribed processes,; not through exceptional incor-
poration of CIL as federal common law).
24 See Young, supra note 1, for one commentator's assessment of the strengths and weak-
nesses of each position. Young concludes, inter alia, that the majority position is inconsistent
with Erie, but that the minority view leaves too little room for the application of CIL in federal
courts. See id. at 372, 410-14, 462, 464-67, 510-11.
25 See Ku & Yoo, supra note 2, at 154 (noting that "neither side has convinced the other"
and that "formalist arguments over the interpretation of the ATS" had reached a stalemate prior
to Sosa).
26 See Martin S. Flaherty, The Future and Past of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 67 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 173 (2004) (arguing that Sosa's "import is to confirm that international
custom was part of judicially enforceable federal law even in the absence of a statute"); Harold
Hongju Koh, The 2004 Term: The Supreme Court Meets International Law, 12 TULSA J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 1, 12-13 (2004) (observing that all circuit courts, and now the Sosa Court, have rejected
the minority position, though Sosa only recognized "a federal common law, civil remedy for a
very limited class of gross human rights violations"); Ku & Yoo, supra note 2, at 170, 199, 204,
206, 219 (noting that Sosa endorsed the majority position on the federal courts' authority to
apply CIL); see also Harlan Grant Cohen, Supremacy and Diplomacy: The International Law of
the U.S. Supreme Court, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 273, 285-86 (2006); William S. Dodge, Bridg-
ing Erie: Customary International Law in the U.S. Legal System After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 87, 88, 95, 100 (2004); Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President
Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97, 104 n.27, 182 n.438 (2004); Gerald
L. Neuman, The Abiding Significance of Law in Foreign Relations, 2004 Sup. CT. REV. 111,
118-19; Leila Nadya Sadat, An American Vision for Global Justice: Taking the Rule of (Interna-
tional) Law Seriously, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 329, 342 (2005); Steinhardt, supra
note 1, at 2251, 2253-55, 2259, 2272; Beth Stephens, Corporate Liability Before and After Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 995, 1000 (2003) [hereinafter Stephens, Corporate Lia-
bility]; Beth Stephens, "The Door Is Still Ajar" for Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70
BROOK. L. REV. 533, 547-50, 556 (2004-2005) [hereinafter Stephens, Human Rights Litigation];
Jon M. Van Dyke, The Role of Customary International Law in Federal and State Court Litiga-
tion, 26 U. HAw. L. REV. 361, 374 (2005); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Our Structural Constitution,
104 COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 1694 (2004); Ehren J. Brav, Recent Development, Opening the Court-
room Doors to Non-Citizens: Cautiously Affirming Filartiga for the Alien Tort Statute, 46 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 265, 266, 273-78 (2005); Leading Cases: Federal Statutes and Regulations, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 446, 451-53 (2004) [hereinafter Leading Cases]; Note, The Offences Clause After Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2378, 2383-85 (2005); Recent Case, Igartda-de la Rosa v.
United States, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1622, 1627 (2006); cf. Julian G. Ku, Structural Conflicts in the
Interpretation of Customary International Law, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 857, 861-62 (2005)
(noting that Sosa, though it appeared to assume that CIL was cognizable in federal courts, did
not completely settle the debate over its status). But cf. Luisa Antoniolli, Taking Legal Plural-
ism Seriously: The Alien Tort Claims Act and the Role of International Law Before U.S. Federal
Courts, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 651, 656, 658 (2005) (asserting that Sosa "established
The George Washington Law Review
Sosa's significance, however, has been both misperceived and un-
derappreciated. Far from endorsing the majority view of CIL, the
Court nodded support for the minority position by demonstrating that
the application of CIL in federal courts turns on congressional in-
tent.2 7 More significantly for current purposes, the Court took this
position in the course of making a broader statement about the status
of international law in federal courts; that is, the Court not only reaf-
firmed the self-execution doctrine with regard to treaties, but also in-
dicated that the substance of that doctrine governs the application of
CIL in federal courts.28 The Court thus set a trajectory toward a uni-
form approach to the application of both sources of international law.
To perceive this broader point in Sosa, one must understand in some
detail the self-execution doctrine that courts use to determine whether
treaties are immediately applicable as federal rules of decision. Part
II discusses the necessary contours of that doctrine.
I. Treaties in U.S. Courts
In contrast to CIL, treaties boast a prominent place in the Consti-
tution. Not only does Article II allocate the authority to make trea-
ties,2 9 but the Supremacy Clause states that "all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
very strict criteria" for the application of CIL in federal courts and confined it "to areas where
there is a congressional mandate"); Christiana Ochoa, Access to U.S. Federal Courts as a Forum
for Human Rights Disputes: Pluralism and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 631, 639, 648 (2005) (observing that Sosa only permits federal courts to apply CIL "in a
very limited set of circumstances"); Eric A. Posner, Transnational Legal Process and the Supreme
Court's 2003-2004 Term: Some Skeptical Observations, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 23, 28
(2004) (remarking that Sosa's true effect will not be known until interpreted by lower courts);
Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492,
1528-29 (2004) (claiming that Sosa held that "Congress has assigned to the federal courts modest
authority to reckon customary international law"); Young, supra note 16, at 521 (arguing that
Sosa "rejected a notion that customary international law just is federal law").
Commentators have also lamented the number of questions regarding CIL's status that Sosa
leaves unresolved. See, e.g., Benjamin Berkowitz, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: United States Courts
as Forums for Human Rights Cases and the New Incorporation Debate, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 289, 290 (2005); Ku & Yoo, supra note 2, at 176; Leading Cases, supra, at 446, 451, 454.
This Article takes issue with both assessments: that Sosa tends to support the majority posi-
tion and that Sosa fails to provide significant guidance on the status of CIL in domestic law.
27 For a more thorough discussion of Sosa's rejection of the majority position, see Curtis
A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law, and the
Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
28 Thus; in substance, the Court rejected prior assertions that "the self-executing treaty
doctrine does not apply to [CIL]." Paust, supra note 13, at 782.
29 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
[Vol. 75:1
2006] An Emerging Uniformity for International Law
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding. ' 30 On its face, the Supremacy
Clause might suggest that treaties could and should be applied as U.S.
law in U.S. courts whenever they are at issue. Since early in U.S. his-
tory, however, the enforcement of treaties in U.S. courts has been lim-
ited by the doctrine of self-execution.
In 1828, the Supreme Court in Foster v. Neilson3' explained that
while the "[C]onstitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land"
and therefore equivalent in status to federal statutes, not all treaties
may be applied by U.S. courts.32 Some treaties resemble contracts by
which states agree to undertake certain acts. The performance of
these acts is entrusted "to the political, not the judicial department;
and the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a
rule for the Court. ' 33 As a result, only treaties that are self-executing
provide domestic rules of decision for U.S. courts; non-self-executing
treaties, while still binding on the United States internationally, 34 re-
quire implementing legislation before their provisions may be judi-
cially enforced. 35 When treaties are invoked as rules of decision, then,
courts must determine whether they are self-executing. 36
30 Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
31 Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1828), overruled in part by United States v.
Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
32 Id. at 314.
33 Id.; see also Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
34 See, e.g., Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (holding that a treaty "depends
for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and honor of the governments which are
parties to it," although it "may also contain provisions which confer certain rights ... which are
capable of [judicial] enforcement as between private parties in the courts of the country"); Diggs
v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 850-51 (D.C. Cir. 1976); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITEO STATES § 111 cmt. h, reporters' note 5 (1987); id. § 321 & cmt.
a.
35 Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314; see also Ogbudimkpa v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 207, 218 &
n.22 (3d Cir. 2003). This is not to say that a treaty that does not provide a right of action may not
be invoked defensively. See Carlos Manuel Vizquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Indi-
viduals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1143-44 (1992).
36 But cf Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 158-59, 183, 187 (1993) (obviat-
ing any need to address self-execution in concluding that the treaty invoked did not guarantee
the right plaintiffs claimed); Maiorano v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 268, 273-75 (1909)
(same); United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1902) (avoiding any need to address
self-execution by concluding that a treaty and statute did not conflict and therefore did not raise
any question of the treaty's superseding effect); Amaya v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 158 F.2d
554, 556 (5th Cir. 1947) (presuming that treaties are generally self-executing); Paust, supra note
13, at 772-73 & nn.83-90 (positing that two lines of Supreme Court cases exist with regard to
self-execution: "one line ... accepted the general distinction between self- and non-self-opera-
tive treaties, while the other ... seems simply to have ignored it"); Vizquez, supra note 12, at
716 & n.99 (noting that while "the lower courts in recent years have treated [an expansive,
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Courts do not always make this determination explicitly or even
after significant analysis.37  As a result, the content of self-execution
analysis has not always been clear. 38 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
abstention-like version of] self-execution as a threshold issue to be addressed in every treaty
case," the Supreme Court has resolved countless cases "without even mentioning the self-execu-
tion issue").
37 For example, courts have repeatedly found, without conducting an express self-execu-
tion analysis, that treaty provisions guaranteeing rights to aliens are enforceable. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 reporters' note 5
(1987) (citing cases from the 1700s, 1800s, and 1900s); see Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598
(citing "treaties, which regulate the mutual rights of citizens or subjects of the contracting na-
tions in regard to rights of property by descent or inheritance, when the individuals concerned
are aliens" as examples of treaties that provide judicially enforceable rights). To illustrate, the
Supreme Court in Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879), concluded that an 1850 treaty
between the United States and Switzerland allowed a Swiss heir to recover the value of U.S. real
estate owned by a deceased Swiss citizen notwithstanding any provision of Virginia law. In arriv-
ing at that conclusion the Supreme Court did not expressly ask whether the treaty was self-
executing, although the Court did cite evidence that would support a conclusion that it was:
namely, that the treaty clearly intended to create specific rights in alien heirs and explicitly con-
templated adjudication by U.S. courts, albeit under U.S. law, if disputes arose among those
claiming interests in U.S. property. Id. at 486-88. Other cases that fail to engage in an explicit
self-execution analysis are abundant. See, e.g., Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 507-08, 517-18
(1947) (holding, without addressing self-execution, that relevant provisions of the U.S.-Germany
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights guaranteeing reciprocal rights for German
and U.S. nationals trumped inconsistent California law); Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 49-58
(1929) (holding, without addressing self-execution, that a U.S.-Denmark treaty that guaranteed
equal treatment for each state's aliens preempted an Iowa law imposing a special inheritance tax
on the estate of a Danish alien); Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 607-16 (1927) (holding,
without explicitly conducting a self-execution analysis, that the Smuggling Convention between
the United States and Britain is self-executing); Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1924)
(concluding, without explicit analysis, that a U.S.-Japan treaty guaranteeing reciprocal rights for
each state's nationals "operate[d] of itself without the aid of any legislation" and trumped a
municipal ordinance); Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 539-43 (1884) (implicitly
concluding that a US.-China treaty that guaranteed rights to certain Chinese aliens was self-
executing). In other cases, the self-execution analysis is summary. See, e.g., Trans World Air-
lines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) (stating that the Warsaw Convention
is self-executing with almost no recorded analysis); Fok Yung Yo v. United States, 185 U.S. 296,
303 (1902) (stating that a Chinese exclusion treaty was self-executing where it preserved an al-
ready existent "privilege of transit" under continuing U.S. regulations); United States v. Rau-
scher, 119 U.S. 407, 419 (1886) (summarily concluding that an extradition treaty with Britain was
supreme federal law and that private rights deriving from that treaty could be enforced "in any
appropriate proceeding"); United States v. Thompson, 928 F.2d 1060, 1066 (11th Cir. 1991)
(summarily agreeing with the district court that the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone "does not create any privately enforceable rights and therefore is not
self-executing"); Smith v. Canadian Pac. Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798, 801-02 (2d Cir. 1971) (cit-
ing lower court decisions for the conclusion that the Warsaw Convention is self-executing).
38 See United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876 (5th Cir. 1979) (noting that "[tihe self-
execution question is perhaps one of the most confounding in treaty law" and, in practice, is
difficult to answer); V~zquez, supra note 12, at 695, 722 (noting the difficulty in distinguishing
between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties); Vdzquez, supra note 35, at 1121.
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and several circuit courts have provided helpful guidance on how to
determine whether a treaty is self-executing and immediately applica-
ble in U.S. courts.
A. Intent of the Political Branches
Most importantly, the courts have indicated that whether a treaty
is self-executing is a question of intent.39 Whose intent-whether that
of the parties to the treaty or that of the U.S. political branches-has
been a matter of debate. 40 Historically, the Restatement of the For-
eign Relations Law of the United States suggested that the intent of
the parties to the treaty governed. 41 Over the years, some courts have
likewise invoked this rule.42 The trend, however, has been to turn to
the intent of the U.S. political branches.43 Even courts that have cited
39 Vdzquez, supra note 12, at 704.
40 Id. at 704-08. Compare, for example, Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir.
1976) ("In determining whether a treaty is self-executing courts look to the intent of the signa-
tory parties .... "), with the Supreme Court opinions discussed in text.
41 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 141 cmt. a (1965) ("Whether a particular treaty is self executing depends on the inter-
pretation of the treaty under the rules stated in §§ 147 and 154."); id. § 147 ("International law
requires that the interpretative process ascertain and give effect to the purpose of the interna-
tional agreement which, as appears from the terms used by the parties, it was intended to
serve."); id. § 154 cmt. a ("[A]n international agreement may involve a commitment by the par-
ties that its provisions will be effective under the domestic law of the parties at the time it goes
into effect. Under the law of the United States such an agreement would normally be inter-
preted as self-executing .... ").
42 See, e.g., Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367, 377 (7th Cir. 2005); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d
450, 468 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated on other grounds, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Goldstar S.A. v. United
States, 967 F.2d 965, 968-69 (4th Cir. 1992); Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761
F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1985); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 778 n.2 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Edwards, J., concurring); British Caledonian Airways Ltd. v. Bond, 665 F.2d 1153, 1160
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Diggs, 555 F.2d at 851; cf. People of Saipan v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d
90, 97 (9th Cir. 1974) (citing "the purposes of the treaty and the objectives of its creators" as one
factor in the self-execution analysis and finding an "intention to establish direct, affirmative, and
judicially enforceable rights" through a Trusteeship Agreement). But cf. Atuar v. United States,
156 Fed. App'x 555, 565 (4th Cir. 2005) (Traxler, J., concurring) (citing the President's state-
ments in transmitting the Convention Against Torture to the Senate and the Senate's non-self-
execution declaration in concluding that the Convention was non-self-executing); Comm. of U.S.
Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Diggs, 555 F.2d
at 851, for the rule that "in 'determining whether a treaty is self-executing' in the sense of its
creating private enforcement rights, 'courts look to the intent of the signatory parties as mani-
fested by the language of the instrument"'); Islamic Republic of Iran v. Boeing Co., 771 F.2d
1279, 1283-84 (9th Cir. 1985) (relying on presidential intent, as reflected in a statement of adher-
ence and an executive order, in determining that executive agreements were non-self-executing
despite the contrary position of the other state party to the agreements).
43 See BARRY E. CARTER, PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE & CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 175 (4th ed. 2003) ("[Ijt is arguable that, despite what courts have said, they end up looking
primarily to the actual or likely intent of the U.S. treatymakers rather than to the intent of all the
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the parties' intent as the governing guidepost have relied, in practice,
on U.S. intent in analyzing self-execution."
For example, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Postal45 ex-
plained that the self-execution analysis is an "attempt to discern the
intent of the parties to the agreement so as to carry out their manifest
purpose. '46 Nonetheless, in conducting its analysis, the court repeat-
edly invoked the United States' intent as the critical consideration.
According to the court,
the question we must answer is whether by ratifying the
Convention on the High Seas the United States undertook to
incorporate the restrictive language of [A]rticle 6 [of the
Convention], which limits the permissible exercise of juris-
diction to those provided by treaty, into its domestic law and
make it available in a criminal action as a defense to the ju-
risdiction of its courts.4 7
In answering this question, the court looked to several indications of
U.S. intent: the United States' failure to manifest a clear, unilateral
desire to treat the agreement as self-executing when other parties to
the agreement did not recognize self-executing agreements; a" substan-
tial U.S. legislation and practice that would be automatically altered
by a self-executing interpretation of Article 6 and no evidence of in-
tent to effect such a sea change through ratification;4 9 legislative testi-
mony from the chairman of the U.S. treaty negotiation team and the
State Department indicating that the treaty was non-self-executing;50
and the presumed U.S. preference to enforce the treaty by foregoing
prosecution of defendants seized in violation of Article 6 only when
the state of the defendants' nationality protested the violation rather
ratifying parties."); Vizquez, supra note 12, at 705 ("Lower courts in recent years . . . have
sought to discern the intent not of the parties to the treaty, but of the U.S. negotiators of the
treaty, the President in transmitting it to the Senate for its advice and consent, and the Senate in
giving its advice and consent."); id. at 705 n.47 (collecting cases).
44 See, e.g., Jogi, 425 F.3d at 378 (citing the parties' intent as the relevant standard but also
giving great weight to testimony of a State Department official and the position of the U.S.
government in concluding that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations was self-execut-
ing); Frolova, 761 F.2d at 376 (citing President Ford's statement that the Helsinki Accords were
"'neither a treaty nor.., legally binding on any particular state"' as "forceful evidence that the
parties did not intend the Accords to be self-executing" (quoting DEP'T ST. BULL., July 7, 1975,
204, 205) (emphasis omitted)).
45 United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979).
46 Id. at 876.
47 Id. at 878.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 878-81.
50 Id. at 881-83.
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than whenever a violation technically occurred. 5' Based on these con-
siderations, the Fifth Circuit did "not believe that the United States
intended to limit its traditionally asserted jurisdiction over foreign ves-
sels on the high seas by adopting Article 6 of the High Seas Conven-
tion" and held that "[t]he determination of this intent must be the
touchstone of our interpretation. '52 Although the opinion had indi-
cated early on that self-execution hinged on the parties' intent, the
court's ultimate conclusion that Article 6 of the High Seas Convention
was not self-executing was based on the intent of the United States.
Many other circuit courts have likewise looked to evidence of the
United States' intent in analyzing self-execution. 53
Consistent with these decisions, the Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States now explicitly takes the
view that "the intention of the United States determines whether an
agreement is to be self-executing. ' '54 This is so because "[in the ab-
sence of special agreement, it is ordinarily for the United States to
51 Id. at 883-84.
52 Id. at 884.
53 See Igarttia-de la Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005) (concluding
that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") was non-self-executing
in part because it "was submitted and ratified on the express condition that it would be 'not self-
executing"' (quoting 138 CONG. REC. S4781, S4784 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992))); Raffington v.
Cangemi, 399 F.3d 900, 903 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that the Convention Against Torture "[als
ratified by the United States... is a non-self-executing treaty"); Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123,
132 & n.7, 140 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing the Senate's non-self-execution declaration and Congress's
enactment of implementing legislation in concluding that the Convention Against Torture was
not self-executing); Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 121, 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2005) (conclud-
ing that the ICCPR was non-self-executing given the Senate's declaration to that effect); Castel-
lano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 551 (6th Cir. 2003) (explaining that Article 3 of the
Convention Against Torture was not self-executing because the Senate declared as much in en-
dorsing ratification); In re Comm'r's Subpoenas, 325 F.3d 1287, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing
statements by the President and State Department in concluding that a Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty with Canada was self-executing because it would be effectuated under existing legisla-
tion); United States v. Duarte-Acero, 296 F.3d 1277, 1283 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing the United
States' non-self-execution declaration to conclude that relevant provisions of the ICCPR were
not self-executing); Dutton v. Warden, 37 Fed. App'x 51, 53 (4th Cir. 2002) (relying on the Sen-
ate's non-self-execution declaration and the executive's intent in proposing such a declaration in
concluding that the ICCPR was not self-executing); Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 267 (5th
Cir. 2001) (concluding that provisions of the ICCPR were not self-executing as the Senate clearly
stated its intent to that effect in a declaration, and collecting cases reaching the same conclu-
sion); Cheung v. United States, 213 F.3d 82, 95 (2d Cir. 2000) (relying on the President's Letter
of Transmittal and a report from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in finding that an
extradition treaty was self-executing); In re Erato, 2 F.3d 11, 15 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing a letter
from the State Department and the Letter of Submittal to the President in concluding that a
Mutual Assistance Treaty with the Netherlands was self-executing).
54 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 111 cmt. h (1987).
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decide how it will carry out [the] international obligations" it has
assumed.55
Although the Supreme Court has not been entirely uniform in its
approach, 56 the Court appears to favor U.S. intent as its guiding star as
well.57 As early as the decision in Foster v. Neilson,58 which is often
cited as the foundation for the self-execution doctrine,59 the Court
turned to evidence from Congress to support its self-execution analy-
sis.60 In Foster, the plaintiff sought to recover property on the author-
ity of a grant made by Spain.61 The defendant argued that the grant
was invalid as it was made after Spain had ceded the land to France,
who in turn ceded it to the United States.62 A U.S.-Spain Treaty of
Amity, Settlement, and Limits provided that all grants made by Spain
prior to a certain date and within territory since ceded to the United
States "shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of
the lands, to the same extent that the same grants would be valid if the
55 Id. But cf. V~zquez, supra note 12, at 707-08 (criticizing the Restatement's reasoning
and conclusion that U.S. intent governs self-execution).
56 See Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523, 526-28 (1951) (concluding that a provision of
the Shipowners' Liability Convention was executed by general maritime law although evidence
from the political branches indicated that implementing legislation was required); id. at 531
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (reaching the same conclusion); Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech, 311
U.S. 150, 159 (1940) (quoting a provision of the General Inter-American Convention for Trade
Mark and Commercial Protection that "the Convention 'shall have the force of law in those
States in which international treaties possess that character, as soon as they are ratified by their
constitutional organs"' in concluding that the Convention was self-executing); Fok Yung Yo v.
United States, 185 U.S. 296, 303 (1902) (arguably analyzing the parties' implicit intent in finding
that the treaty provision at issue was self-executing because, inter alia, it manifested assent to the
continuance of applicable U.S. regulations).
57 In addition to the opinions cited in the text, see Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct.
2669, 2694 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing a Senate Executive Report to support the con-
clusion that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations is self-executing); Trans World Air-
lines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 276 n.5 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting, in
a case where both the majority and the dissent found the Warsaw Convention to be self-execut-
ing, that the Solicitor General had taken that position as well); Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318
U.S. 724, 738 (1943) (Stone, C.J., dissenting) (citing a letter to the President from the Secretary
of State in concluding, consistent with that letter, see Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523, 526
n.2 (1951), that part of the Shipowners' Liability Convention was self-executing, while part was
executory); Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501, 530 & n.39 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(citing Congress's perception that implementing legislation was unnecessary and a communica-
tion from the Secretary of State in suggesting that a treaty was self-executing).
58 Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), overruled in part by United States v.
Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
59 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 13, at 766-67 (asserting that the concept of non-self-execu-
tion was "invented" in Foster).
60 See Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 315-17.
61 Id. at 299.
62 Id. at 299-300.
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territories had remained under the dominion of" Spain.63 This provi-
sion potentially resolved the dispute.64 The Court, however, con-
cluded that the provision was not self-executing and therefore could
not be applied as a rule of decision.65 The Court based this conclu-
sion, in large part, on the fact that the treaty provided that Spanish
grants "shall be ratified and confirmed," rather than "shall be valid"
or "are hereby confirmed," and thus contemplated confirmation
through legislative enactment.66 The Court bolstered its finding of
non-self-execution by inferring that Congress also understood the
treaty to be executory and thus had established a means for confirm-
ing grants "embraced by the treaty" within territory not at issue in
Foster.67
Interestingly, in the later case of United States v. Percheman,68 the
Court was presented with the equally authoritative Spanish version of
this same treaty, which provided that grants "shall remain ratified and
confirmed. ' 69 In light of this language, the Court switched tack and
found the provision to be self-executing. 70 In so doing, the Court, one
might argue, disregarded the intent of Congress inferred in Foster.
However, as in Foster, the Court in Percheman looked to the intent of
the political branches to support its conclusion regarding the provi-
sion's self-executing character. Thus, the Court noted that "the
United States [treatymakers] could have [had] no motive" in insisting
on implementing legislation where the law of nations would have se-
cured prior Spanish grants even in the absence of the treaty with
Spain.71 In both of these early cases, then, the Court turned to U.S.
intent to bolster its self-execution analysis. Since Foster and
Percheman, the Court has given an even more prominent place to the
intent of the political branches in the self-execution inquiry.
In a 1913 case, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide
whether the 1900 Treaty of Brussels trumped a prior federal statute
63 Id. at 310 (quotation omitted).
64 Id. at 310-14.
65 Id. at 314.
66 Id. at 314-15 (quotation omitted).
67 Id. at 315. Congress enacted no such statute for the territory in which the disputed land
was located and thus left that territory subject to an earlier statute that annulled grants of land
the title to which had been held by Spain at the time Spain arguably ceded the territory to
France. Id. at 300, 315-17.
68 United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
69 Id. at 88 (quotation omitted).
70 Id. at 88-89.
71 Id.
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and extended the life of a patent issued under that statute. 72 Key to
that question was whether the treaty was self-executing73 The Su-
preme Court found that Congress's enactment of legislation to carry
the treaty into effect provided near-certain evidence of "the sense of
Congress and those concerned with the treaty1741 that it required legis-
lation to become effective. ' 75 Moreover, the member of Congress in
charge of the proposed implementing legislation said that the bill "was
to carry [the treaty] into effect. '76 The Court thus focused on U.S.
intent in analyzing self-execution. That is not to say that the Court
ignored the intent of the other parties to the treaty. The Court relied
on the fact that many of the other treaty parties had enacted, or in-
tended to enact, legislation to effectuate the treaty, but did so to bol-
ster its finding that the unequivocal "sense of Congress" was that the
treaty required an implementing act.77
The Supreme Court similarly focused on the intent of the political
branches when, in 1933, it was called upon to decide whether the Pro-
hibition-era Convention for the Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicat-
ing Liquors between the United States and Britain trumped a prior
provision of the U.S. Tariff Act. 78 In determining that the Convention
was self-executing, the Court relied on the following evidence of the
political branches' intent: a letter from the Secretary of State to the
Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs expressing that
view, the Treasury Department's issuance of amended instructions to
the Coast Guard following ratification of the treaty that treaties of this
type should be followed notwithstanding the Tariff Act, and the Solici-
tor General's representation that the Coast Guard Commandant had
been instructed to conduct seizures of British vessels consistent with
the treaty.79
More recently in Sosa, the Court again suggested that it is U.S.
intent that governs the self-execution question. The plaintiff in Sosa
argued that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
72 Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. City of Knoxville, 227 U.S. 39, 41 (1913).
73 Id. at 44.
74 Presumably, this refers to the Secretaries of State and Interior. As the Supreme Court
noted, the Secretary of the Interior had drafted a bill to implement the treaty and the Secretary
of State had relied on that fact to assuage international concern over the United States' lack of
implementing legislation. Id. at 49.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 49-50.
77 Id. at 50.
78 Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 107 (1933).
79 Id. at 119 & n.19.
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("ICCPR"),80 to which the United States is a party, created a private
cause of action for arbitrary detention.8' The Court replied that the
ICCPR could not itself create rights enforceable in federal courts be-
cause the Senate had ratified the ICCPR subject to a declaration that
the ICCPR's substantive terms were non-self-executing. 82 If the par-
ties' intent were the controlling inquiry, the Senate's declaration may
have been relevant to, but not determinative of, the issue. As it was,
the Supreme Court found the Senate's declaration dispositive for self-
execution purposes.83
The touchstone of the self-execution analysis, then, appears to be
the intent of the federal political branches. 84 In some cases, discerning
that intent may be easy. An agreement might "expressly provide for
legislative execution" of its provision, arguably rendering the agree-
ment executory, 85 or clearly stipulate that implementing legislation is
80 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1996, S. TREATY Doc.
No. 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
81 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734 (2004).
82 Id. at 735; see also supra note 53.
83 Cf V~zquez, supra note 12, at 706-07 ("If the intent of the U.S. treaty makers were
dispositive, unilateral statements reflecting the views of the President and two-thirds of the Sen-
ate that the treaty is not self-executing would effectively make the treaty non-self-executing.").
84 That the intent of the United States' political branches is the relevant standard does not
mean that the courts will simply defer to executive statements made in litigation regarding the
nature of the treaty. See Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 685-86 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing) (noting, in discussing whether Article 36 of the Vienna Convention created private rights,
that the executive's "understanding of our treaty obligations" deserves "considerable weight,"
but "is not beyond debate"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 154(1) (1965) (stating that courts must decide the self-execution issue
when it is presented in litigation).
85 British Caledonian Airways Ltd. v. Bond, 665 F.2d 1153, 1160, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(concluding that a provision that required action by an international organization rather than by
contracting states was self-executing, while a provision requiring contracting states "'to adopt all
practicable measures, through the issuance of special regulations or otherwise"' would not be
(quoting Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 22, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1944,
T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295)); see also Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 737 n.24
(1943) (taking note of provisions of the Shipowners' Liability Convention that provide that na-
tional laws may make exceptions to the Convention); Fok Yung Yo v. United States, 185 U.S.
296, 303, 305 (1902) (finding self-executing a treaty that continued a privilege secured by existing
regulations); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 630 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting)
("[A] stipulation in a treaty, to legislate or not to legislate in a certain way, has been repeatedly
held in this court to address itself to the political or the legislative power, by whose action
thereon this court is bound."), superseded on other grounds by U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV;
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829), overruled in part by United States v.
Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833); Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 207 n.1 (4th Cir. 2006)
(Traxler, J., dissenting) (holding that treaty language obligating states "'[to] take all appropriate
measures to secure . . . the implementation of the objects of"' a treaty did "not evidence an
intent that the agreement be self-executing" (quoting Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
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not necessary as the treaty is self-executing. 86 In the absence of con-
International Child Abduction art. 2, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 19 I.L.M. 1501)); In re
Rath, 402 F.3d 1207, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding Paris Convention for the Protection of Indus-
trial Property non-self-executing because it provided that party states would adopt measures
necessary for its implementation); Goldstar S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968-69 (4th Cir.
1992) (finding that where a treaty indicated that party nations would take further action to im-
plement it, that treaty was non-self-executing); Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
761 F.2d 370, 376 (7th Cir. 1985); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 809 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Bork, J., concurring) ("A treaty that provides that party states will take measures through
their own laws to enforce its proscriptions evidences its intent not to be self-executing."); Man-
nington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1298-99 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that a
treaty provision by which states undertook to enact laws necessary to secure treaty's application
evidenced non-self-execution); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876-77 (5th Cir. 1979) (cit-
ing provisions from the Convention on the High Seas that begin, "Every State shall take the
necessary legislative measures to .... " as examples of provisions that are expressly executory);
Robertson v. Gen. Elec. Co., 32 F.2d 495, 500-02 (4th Cir. 1929) (concluding that a treaty stating
that nations would extend a particular right was not self-executing); cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316
F.3d 450, 468 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated on other grounds, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Islamic Repubc of
Iran v. Boeing Co., 771 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1985); People of Saipan v. U.S. Dep't of Inte-
rior, 502 F.2d 90, 96 & n.6, 103 n.7 (9th Cir. 1974). But cf Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin
Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 247, 252, 254 nn.25-26, 261 (1984) (holding that, although the Warsaw
Convention invites further action by parties, it is nonetheless self-executing); Paust, supra note
13, at 774 n.97 (arguing that a treaty provision obliging states to take the necessary measures to
ensure the treaty's application should not render the treaty non-self-executing in the United
States); Vizquez, supra note 12, at 709-10 (same).
Similarly, to the extent that a treaty "purports to accomplish what is within the exclusive
lawmaking power of Congress," it is easy to conclude that the treaty was intended to be non-self-
executing. Id. at 718; see British Caledonian Airways, 665 F.2d at 1160 (remarking that whether
a treaty is self-executing is a question of interpretation outside of the select few instances in
which "the subject matter is within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress"); Edwards v. Carter,
580 F.2d 1055, 1058-59 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that exclusive constitutional "grants of power
to Congress operate to limit the treaty power"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111(4)(c) & cmt. i (1987) (noting that treaties may be
characterized as non-self-executing "if implementing legislation is constitutionally required");
Paust, supra note 13, at 777-82 (agreeing with this principle, but arguing that the war power is
Congress's only exclusive power). Finally, if a treaty merely requires a state to refrain from
acting, some have suggested that it is likely to be considered self-executing. See Commonwealth
v. Hawes, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 697, 702-03 (1878) ("When it is provided by treaty that certain acts
shall not be done, or that certain limitations or restrictions shall not be disregarded or exceeded
by the contracting parties, the compact does not need to be supplemented by legislative or exec-
utive action .... "); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 111 reporters' note 5 (1987) ("[Treaty-imposed o]bligations not to act, or to act only
subject to limitations, are generally self-executing."). But see Yuji Iwasawa, The Doctrine of Self-
Executing Treaties in the United States: A Critical Analysis, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 627, 674-75 (1986)
(noting that negative obligations in treaties may be non-self-executing if they are too imprecise);
Vizquez, supra note 12, at 703 n.41 (arguing that any distinction between treaty obligations to
act and not to act in the self-execution analysis are "unworkab[le] and irrelevan[t]").
86 See Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 159 (1940) (quoting a provision of the
General Inter-American Convention for Trade Mark and Commercial Protection that "the Con-
vention 'shall have the force of law in those States in which international treaties possess that
character, as soon as they are ratified by their constitutional organs"' in concluding that the
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trary U.S. intent, courts will likely follow the lead of these express
provisions. 87 However, in many cases, intent will not be so obvious.
Other factors will bear on deciphering implied intent 88 and on the out-
come of the self-execution analysis.89
Convention was self-executing); United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 88-89 (1833)
(concluding that a treaty provision was self-executing where the equally authoritative Spanish
version provided that "grants 'shall remain ratified and confirmed"' rather than "shall be ratified
and confirmed" as had been supposed); McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 271
F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("If a treaty contains language clearly indicating its status as
self-executing, courts regard that language as conclusive."); Am. Express Co. v. United States, 4
Ct. Cust. 146, 159 (1913) (interpreting as self-executing a favored-nation clause providing that
any favor granted to a third state "shall immediately become common to" the treaty partner
state because a favor "could not immediately become common" if extension of the favor re-
quired implementing legislation).
In both of these situations, one might argue that it is the parties' intent that is controlling.
Indeed, in the absence of evidence of contrary U.S. intent, the parties' intent may be the best
evidence of the United States' intent. Or, put differently, the parties' intent controls to the
extent it is consistent with the United States' intent. The ultimate standard, however, is U.S.
intent.
87 Cf. Igarttia-de la Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that
some treaties "may comprise international commitments, but they are not domestic law unless
Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that
it be 'self-executing' and is ratified on these terms" (emphasis added)); id. (expressing skepticism
that there is room "for courts to second-guess the joint position of the President and the Senate
that a treaty is not self-executing"). But cf Halberstam, supra note 13, at 92, 95 (arguing, con-
trary to the suggestion in Sosa, that the President and Senate cannot, consistent with the Consti-
tution, declare an otherwise self-executing treaty to be non-self-executing).
88 Cf. Vizquez, supra note 12, at 711 (arguing that courts' consideration of these addi-
tional factors yields "a purely constructive [or imputed] intent (which is to say, no[ ] intent at
all)"). As noted later, whether these additional factors are perceived as tools for identifying
congressional intent or judicial constructs for maintaining the proper allocation of authority be-
tween the political and judicial branches, they form, in connection with the focus on the political
branches' intent, a coherent separation of powers analysis. See infra note 249 and accompanying
text.
89 Occasionally, courts cite a fairly standardized list of factors that may be considered in
conducting a self-execution analysis:
(1) the language and purposes of the agreement as a whole; (2) the circumstances
surrounding its execution; (3) the nature of the obligations imposed by the agree-
ment; (4) the availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement mechanisms; (5)
the implications of permitting a private right of action; and (6) the capability of the
judiciary to resolve the dispute.
Frolova, 761 F.2d at 373; see Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367, 377 (7th Cir. 2005) (listing several of the
Frolova factors); People of Saipan, 502 F.2d at 97 (listing as factors "the purposes of the treaty
and the objectives of its creators, the existence of domestic procedures and institutions appropri-
ate for direct implementation, the availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement meth-
ods, and the immediate and long-range social consequences of self- or non-self-execution");
Boeing Co., 771 F.2d at 1283 (quoting the list of factors from People of Saipan); Postal, 589 F.2d
at 877 (same); see also Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (looking to the
signatories' intent "as manifested by the language of the instrument, and, if the instrument is
uncertain,.., the circumstances surrounding its execution"); Iwasawa, supra note 85, at 653-86
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B. Specific Definition
The first such factor might be called specific definition. Courts
considering whether a treaty is self-executing often look to the lan-
guage of the treaty90 to determine whether it defines specific obliga-
tions that are capable of judicial enforcement. 91 In Frolova v. Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics,92 for example, the Seventh Circuit was
required to decide whether U.N. Charter Articles 55 and 56 and the
Helsinki Accords were self-executing. 93 Article 55 identifies goals of
the United Nations, such as "higher standards of living" and "univer-
sal respect for ... human rights. '94 In Article 56, U.N. member states
"pledge ... to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the
[United Nations] for the achievement of" these goals.95 The Court
found these articles to be "phrased in broad generalities, suggesting
(discussing factors courts consider in the self-execution analysis). This Article does not parrot
this list, but seeks to repackage the list to better reflect the issues courts actually consider in
analyzing whether a treaty is immediately enforceable and to reveal similarities to the factors the
Sosa Court imposed for applying CIL in federal courts.
Nor are the factors discussed here necessarily exhaustive. The Supreme Court in Sosa indi-
cated that additional, unidentified considerations might bear on the incorporation of CIL. See
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004). Similarly, other considerations arguably
might be extracted from past decisions addressing self-execution. See, for example, Fok Yung
Yo, 185 U.S. at 303, and In re Comm'r's Subpoenas, 325 F.3d 1287, 1291 (lth Cir. 2003), in
which preexistent domestic law through which treaties might be implemented is cited in conclud-
ing that treaties are self-executing. Of course, this preexisting law might have been viewed as
implementing legislation, rendering the self-execution question moot, or as evidence of intent
that the treaties be immediately enforceable, in which case consideration of preexistent law does
not necessarily add a factor to the self-execution analysis. The point, however, is that analysis of
the domestic status of both treaties and CIL may embrace additional considerations.
90 See Frolova, 761 F.2d at 373 (going so far as to assert that "if the parties' intent is clear
from the treaty's language courts will not inquire into [other] factors").
91 See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 428 n.22 (1984) ("[T]he language of Article 34" of the
U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which "merely called on nations to facilitate
the admission of refugees to the extent possible,... was precatory and not self-executing."); Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (noting
that Articles 1 and 2 of the U.N. Charter "contain general 'purposes and principles,' some of
which state mere aspirations and none of which can sensibly be thought to have been intended to
be judicially enforceable at the behest of individuals"); Diggs, 555 F.2d at 851 (finding a U.N.
Security Council resolution not self-executing where it did not "confer rights upon individual
citizens, . . .provide specific standards," or even establish standards typical of "conventional
adjudication," but rather called on governments to take action and invoked standards that were
"rooted in diplomacy and its incidents"); Vizquez, supra note 12, at 712-15 (discussing courts'
consideration of whether a treaty creates obligations or aspirations, and whether the treaty pro-
vides determinate standards).
92 Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985).
93 Id. at 373.
94 U.N. Charter art. 55.
95 Id. art. 56.
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that they are declarations of principles, not a code of legal rights." 96
Their broad language did not "indicate[ ] an intent to prescribe 'rules
by which private rights may be determined,' or to provide a means by
which citizens of the signatory nations could enforce the lofty, but too
often unrealized, principles expressed in the Charter." 97 The general
language of these provisions undercut a finding that they were self-
executing. 98
The court likewise found that the language of the Helsinki Ac-
cords rendered the Accords executory. 99 While the relevant language
of the Accords was more specific than that of the U.N. Charter, it was
still "phrased in generalities."' 100 In addition, the language reaffirmed
principles of state sovereignty and nonintervention and provided the
signatory states with significant discretion that belied an intent to de-
fine specific, judicially enforceable rights.1° 1
By contrast, the language of the U.S.-Japan treaty before the Su-
preme Court in Asakura v. City of Seattle °2 was specific, detailed, and
imperative, guaranteeing that
[t]he citizens or subjects of each of the high contracting par-
ties shall have liberty to enter, travel and reside in the terri-
tories of the other to carry on trade, wholesale and retail, to
own or lease and occupy houses, manufactories, warehouses
and shops, to employ agents of their choice, to lease land for
residential and commercial purposes, and generally to do an-
ything incident to or necessary for trade upon the same
terms as native citizens or subjects.10 3
Although the Supreme Court did not expressly discuss the quality of
this language, or any other factor, in concluding that this provision
was self-executing and trumped a discriminatory municipal ordinance,
the specific, detailed nature of the language certainly supported a
finding of self-execution. 0 4
96 Frolova, 761 F.2d at 374.
97 Id. (quoting Dreyfus v. Von F'mck, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 1976)).
98 Id.; see also Hitai v. INS, 343 F.2d 466, 468 (2d Cir. 1965) (concluding that Article 55 is
not self-executing).
99 Frolova, 761 F.2d at 375-76.
100 Id. at 375.
101 See id. at 375-76.
102 Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924).
103 Id. at 340 (quoting U.S.-Japan Treaty, Apr. 5, 1911, 37 Stat. 1504).
104 See also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 247, 252 (1984)
(concluding that the Warsaw Convention is self-executing without explicitly relying on the spe-
cific, detailed, and mandatory nature of the liability limits the Convention imposes for air carri-
ers); Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 737-38 & n.24 (1943) (concluding, without
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Similarly, Article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas, at issue
in United States v. Postal, "[o]n its face . . . [bore] a self-executing
construction because it purport[ed] to" define the specific situations
under which foreign states may and may not exercise jurisdiction over
vessels on the high seas.105 Although the Fifth Circuit ultimately held
that the context of Article 6 rendered it executory, the Article's speci-
ficity pointed toward self-execution. 10 6
Article 6 of the Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese
Mandated Islands likewise was found to be self-executing where the
Agreement was a more detailed embodiment of the general, and pre-
sumably non-self-executing, 1°7 trusteeship provisions of the U.N.
Charter.108 Although "the substantive rights guaranteed through
the . . . Agreement [were] not precisely defined," they nonetheless
"require[d] little legal or administrative innovation in the domestic
fora" and were not "too vague for judicial enforcement," particularly
because there were other sources to which a court might look to give
the rights content and because the Agreement was the constitutional
document for the Trust Territory. 10 9
explicitly referring to the specific, detailed, and imperative nature of a provision of the Shipown-
ers' Liability Convention, that the provision was self-executing); Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech,
311 U.S. 150, 158-61 (1940) (concluding tersely that the General Inter-American Convention for
Trade Mark and Commercial Protection is self-executing after, among other things, quoting, but
not expressly emphasizing, the specific, detailed, and imperative text of the Convention); cf.
Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 507-08, 514-15, 517 (1947) (quoting the specific, detailed, and
imperative language of U.S.-Germany treaty provisions guaranteeing rights to each states' na-
tionals in the course of concluding, without a self-execution analysis, that the provisions, if appli-
cable, trumped California law); Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 50 (1929) (quoting the specific,
detailed, and imperative language of a U.S.-Denmark treaty regarding reciprocal treatment of
aliens that the Court applied without explicitly addressing the self-execution issue); Chew Heong
v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 541-43 (1884) (same with regard to a U.S.-China treaty guaran-
teeing equal treatment to Chinese aliens).
105 United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 877 (5th Cir. 1979). Article 6 provides that
"[s]hips shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases expressly pro-
vided for in international treaties or in these articles, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction
on the high seas." Convention on the High Seas art. 6, para. 1, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
2315, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 86.
106 Postal, 589 F.2d at 877-78.
107 While the majority "assume[d] without deciding that" the relevant articles of the U.N.
Charter did not "create affirmative and judicially enforceable obligations," People of Saipan v.
U.S. Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 96 (9th Cit. 1974), Judge Trask, in his concurrence, thought it
clear "that the Charter of the United Nations is not self-executing and does not in and of itself
create rights which are justiciable between individual litigants," id. at 100 (Trask, J., concurring).
lo8 Id. at 96-97 (majority opinion).
109 Id. at 97, 99. The Ninth Circuit's willingness to find the Trusteeship Agreement judi-
cially enforceable without more specificity stretches the concept of specific definition. See id. at
103 & n.7 (Trask, J., concurring) (arguing that the language of the Trusteeship Agreement was
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As these examples reflect, specific definition is a key considera-
tion in the self-execution analysis. 110 Treaties that speak in terms of
specific obligations are more likely to be found self-executing than
treaties that embody more ethereal commitments.
C. Mutuality
A related consideration is mutuality. In United States v. Postal,
the Fifth Circuit indicated that when a treaty is multilateral and in-
volves state parties who do not recognize self-executing treaties,
greater evidence is required that the United States nonetheless in-
tended the treaty to be self-executing in its courts., The reason, it
seems, is that when the United States enters treaties with states that
do not permit self-execution, the United States may be offering a self-
executing commitment in exchange for an executory promise-a
skewed bargain that should not, as a rule, be presumed. 12 The
insufficiently precise to be self-executing). The Ninth Circuit's willingness seems justified, how-
ever, by the unique position of the Trusteeship Agreement. The Agreement had been "codified
into the law of the Trust Territory" by the Trust Territory government and was "the plaintiffs'
basic constitutional document." Id. at 98 (majority opinion); see id. at 103 (Trask, J., concurring).
Judicial enforcement of constitutional texts routinely requires interpretation of rather vague
terms. See id. at 99 (majority opinion). As a result, the court seemed more willing to find the
Agreement judicially enforceable notwithstanding some lack of specificity. See id. Had the
Trusteeship Agreement been a stand-alone treaty that had not been codified as domestic consti-
tutional law, greater specificity presumably would have been required before finding the Agree-
ment self-executing.
110 See also Fok Yung Yo v. United States, 185 U.S. 296, 303 (1902) (finding a treaty provi-
sion dealing with alien transit to be self-executing where it, among other things, "dealt with the
subject specifically").
111 Postal, 589 F.2d at 878. But cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES § 111 cmt. h (1987) ("Whether an agreement is or is not self-
executing in the law of another state party to the agreement is not controlling for the United
States.").
112 See Postal, 589 F.2d at 878, 882-83 (expressing concern for "mutuality" and "reciprocal
obligations"). The assumption that the commitments of states that do not recognize self-execu-
tion are less valuable has been criticized as a factual matter on two grounds. First,
in many (if not most) [ ] such states there exists a cabinet form of government in
which executive and legislative powers are merged. In such situations, the govern-
ment in power is in practice able to get the necessary parliamentary implementa-
tion almost as surely and as efficiently as if the agreement were self-executing. In
states where the ratification process requires general legislative approval, imple-
menting legislation is introduced as a part of the ratification process.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 154 re-
porters' note 1 (1965). Second, "whether or not a treaty or provision will be self-executing for a
particular state party, and any lack of mutuality in this respect, have generally not been consider-
ations when states enter into treaty obligations." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RE-
LATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 reporters' note 5 (1987).
The view that U.S. courts should be more reluctant to find a treaty self-executing when it
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skewed bargain does not result merely because a treaty is multilateral,
as multilateral treaties may involve only states in which treaties are or
may be self-executing. Thus, whether a treaty is bi- or multi-lateral is
not determinative. Nor does an unbalanced bargain arise in every in-
stance involving a state that does not permit self-execution. As the
court in Postal recognized, a bilateral treaty with Britain, which typi-
cally does not recognize self-execution,113 could be self-executing in
the United States where the treaty nonetheless created "mutual rights
and obligations.' 1 14 Thus, the Smuggling Convention was self-execut-
ing where it secured for the United States authority to board British
vessels outside U.S. territorial waters and provided British vessels the
right to bring "liquor into the United States under seal in certain spec-
ified circumstances" as well as "a mechanism for settling claims" aris-
ing from the United States' improper use of its treaty powers.115 At
the heart of this consideration, then, is concern for mutuality-a
treaty is more likely to be found self-executing in the United States
when other state parties have accepted self-executing obligations or
when the treaty immediately secures rights to its parties.
D. Practical Consequences
Likewise, a treaty is more likely to be found self-executing when
such a finding would not trigger broad or untoward consequences.
The consequences of finding Article 6 of the High Seas Convention
self-executing led the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Postal to con-
clude that the United States did not intend such consequences to re-
sult from ratification." 6 Article 6 provides that ships on the high seas
involves states that do not permit self-execution has also been criticized as a conceptual matter.
See id. (explaining that such a rule is misguided because self-execution facilitates the United
States' compliance with its treaty obligations and because another state's material default on its
obligations would entitle the United States to terminate or suspend its obligations); John M.
Rogers, Prosecuting Terrorists: When Does Apprehension in Violation of International Law Pre-
clude Trial?, 42 U. MiAmi L. REv. 447, 462-65 (1987) (arguing that the mutuality consideration
undercuts constitutional authority to enter treaties that are supreme domestic law); V~zquez,
supra note 12, at 704 (arguing that the Supremacy Clause does not prevent a treaty from being
"'self-executing' in the United States even if it is 'non-self-executing' for other nations" and that
the parties to a treaty should be required to clearly state any "intent to alter [that] principle").
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the concept of mutuality has played a role in the self-execution
analysis of U.S. courts, supporting a finding of self-execution when mutuality of commitment
exists.
113 Postal, 589 F.2d at 878 n.24; Vdzquez, supra note 12, at 697 & n.12.
114 Postal, 589 F.2d at 882.
115 Id. at 882-83.
116 Id. at 878-81; see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 810 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (concluding that the Hague Conventions on the Laws of War were
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"'shall be subject to [the] . . . exclusive jurisdiction' of the state under
whose flag they sail, "'save in exceptional cases expressly provided for
in international treaties or in these articles. ' 1117 As the Fifth Circuit
recognized, the United States had, since inception, asserted jurisdic-
tion on the high seas beyond the limits imposed by Article 6.118 In
1790, the United States enacted a statute that authorized the boarding
of foreign vessels outside U.S. territorial waters but within twelve
miles of the U.S. coast.1 19 This statute, upheld by the Supreme Court,
spawned similar succeeding statutes that have continued to the pre-
sent and that have also been reviewed by U.S. courts.1 20 Other stat-
utes, both preceding and succeeding the High Seas Convention, have
authorized U.S. jurisdiction even beyond twelve miles for certain pur-
poses.1 21 Recognizing Article 6 as self-executing would have invali-
dated all of these statutes to the extent they conflicted with Article 6
and were enacted before the Convention was ratified. 122 The conse-
quences of finding Article 6 to be self-executing were therefore broad
and inconsistent with past and present U.S. policy. 123
Had the consequences been more narrow, as was the case with
the Smuggling Convention, which affected "the jurisdiction of the
United States only [with regard to] seizures of British vessels engaged
in smuggling liquor," the court might have reached a different result,
as it did with the Smuggling Convention. 124 As it was, Article 6 of the
High Seas Convention amounted to "a sweeping prohibition on the
non-self-executing and not available to private plaintiffs, as a contrary finding "could create
perhaps hundreds of thousands or millions of lawsuits" by victims of "large-scale war" that might
overreach "the capacity of any legal system" and present "an obstacle to the negotiation of
peace and the resumption of normal relations between nations"); cf Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Coun-
cil, 509 U.S. 155, 177 (1993) (reasoning that the United States did not silently assume an obliga-
tion to aliens outside its borders in ratifying the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees given the broad consequences of assuming such an obligation); Robertson v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 32 F.2d 495, 500 (4th Cir. 1929) ("Treaties ... ought not to interfere with the [compli-
cated] domestic machinery which the several countries have provided for the regulation of
patents.").
117 Postal, 589 F.2d at 869 (quoting Convention on the High Seas, supra note 105, 13 U.S.T.
at 2315, 450 U.N.T.S. at 86).
118 Id. at 879. Article 6 would permit some, but not all, of the control the United States had
exerted outside its territorial waters. See id. at 880-81 & n.30.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 879-80 & nn.28-29. These succeeding statutes include 19 U.S.C. §§ 1401(j),
1709(c), 1581, 1586 (2000).
121 Postal, 589 F.2d at 880 & n.30.
122 See id. at 878 & n.25.
123 See id. at 880-81 & n.30, 883.
124 Id. at 883.
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exercise of jurisdiction against foreign vessels on the high seas, ' 125 and
the court concluded that Article 6 was non-self-executing. 126
E. Foreign Relations Effects
While the practical consequences of self-execution may vary, one
consequence has played a particular role in self-execution analysis: the
foreign affairs effects of self-execution. Relevant effects include the
impact on relations with other states, on the proper distribution of
authority to conduct foreign affairs, and relatedly, on the political
branches' discretion to conduct foreign affairs. The relevance of the
first effect-the impact on relations with other states-was illustrated
in Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 127 as well as in the
Supreme Court's opinion in Asakura v. City of Seattle. 28 In Frolova,
as noted above, 129 a U.S. plaintiff argued that Articles 55 and 56 of the
U.N. Charter as well as the Helsinki Accords were self-executing and
prevented the Soviet Union from claiming sovereign immunity in
plaintiff's damage suit challenging the Soviet Union's failure to permit
her husband, a Soviet citizen, to emigrate to the United States. 130 The
Soviet Union had twice refused the husband's emigration application
due to "bad relations with the United States" and because his "depar-
ture was not in the interest of the Soviet State. ' 131 In deciding
whether Articles 55 and 56 and the Helsinki Accords were self-execut-
ing, the Seventh Circuit noted that "judicial resolution of cases bear-
ing significantly on sensitive foreign policy matters ...might have
serious foreign policy implications which courts are ill-equipped to an-
ticipate or handle.' 1 32 Frolova was just such a case. "Soviet emigra-
tion policies [had] been the subject of a long-running battle between
American policymakers and the Kremlin, often generating conflict be-
tween the White House and Congress. Judicial intervention into such
125 Id.
126 See id. at 884. But cf Rogers, supra note 112, at 464 (characterizing the Postal court's
reasoning in this regard as effectively finding the Convention to be non-self-executing because
the United States had not intended to comply with its provisions). By contrast, the fact that the
treaty provision at issue in People of Saipan dealt with "the local economy and environment, not
[the more sensitive, far-reaching, not to mention discretionary, issue of] security," supported a
finding that the provision was self-executing. People of Saipan v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 502
F.2d 90, 97 (9th Cir. 1974).
127 Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985).
128 Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924).
129 See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
130 Frolova, 761 F.2d at 371, 373.
131 Id. at 371 (quotations omitted).
132 Id. at 375.
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a delicate political issue would be ill-advised and could have unfore-
seen consequences for American-Soviet relations.11 33 As a result, the
court declined to find Articles 55 and 56 or the Helsinki Accords self-
executing and privately enforceable. 134
This is not to suggest that any impact on foreign affairs renders a
treaty executory in U.S. courts. In Asakura, the Supreme Court noted
that "[t]reaties for the protection of citizens of one country residing in
the territory of another are numerous, and make for good understand-
ing between nations"; indeed, the treaty the United States and Japan
entered along these lines "was made to strengthen friendly relations
between [them].' 135 The Court suggested that the foreign affairs ben-
efits of these treaties support finding them self-executing, at least
when the self-executing nature of the treaty is otherwise clear and
when the self-execution issue is forced by state or local legislation that
undercuts the treaties' foreign affairs benefits. 136
The foreign affairs benefits of self-execution may also justify such
a finding when self-execution would both improve relations with other
states and, consistent with another foreign affairs concern that courts
consider, not unduly infringe on the United States' discretion to con-
duct foreign affairs. To illustrate, the court in Postal noted that the
United States entered the Smuggling Convention with Great Britain
to validate seizures of foreign vessels outside U.S. territorial waters,
but also "to avoid the repeated [and inevitable] protests that the Brit-
ish . . . lodged against . . . seizures" of British vessels outside those
waters. 137 Absent these protests, U.S. law, under the doctrine of Ker
v. Illinois,138 might have sanctioned U.S. jurisdiction over defendants
133 Id.
134 See id. The result was that the plaintiff had to resort to "diplomatic channels and the
court of world opinion," rather than U.S. courts, if she wished to pursue her claim. Id.; see also
id. at 376 ("Individuals aggrieved by the failure of nations to implement [non-self-executing trea-
ties] will have to be content with the principle that violations of international agreements are
normally to be redressed outside the courtroom." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
135 Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924).
136 Cf Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 540 (1884) (suggesting that concern for
the United States' reputation for treaty compliance supports a presumption that federal legisla-
tion was not intended to abrogate a treaty).
137 United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 883 (5th Cir. 1979).
138 Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Ker, together with the decision in Frisbie v. Collins,
342 U.S. 519 (1952), established the rule that unlawful seizure of a defendant ordinarily does not
affect the court's authority to try the defendant. See Ker, 119 U.S. at 444; Frisbie, 342 U.S. at
522. However, an exception to the rule has been recognized where the seizure occurs in viola-
tion of a self-executing treaty. See, e.g., United States v. Best, 304 F.3d 308, 313-14 (3d Cir.
2002).
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so seized even if a treaty violation had technically occurred. 139 As a
result, the United States would retain discretion over the decision to
seize British vessels. However, where British objection appeared in-
evitable and where objection raised the possibility that U.S. law would
not permit jurisdiction resulting from seizures in violation of a treaty,
finding the Smuggling Convention to be self-executing both improved
U.S. foreign relations with Great Britain and did not limit the political
branches' foreign affairs discretion more than U.S. law might have.
Both the concern for relations with other states and the concern over
limiting the United States' foreign affairs discretion permitted a find-
ing that the Smuggling Convention was self-executing.
In contrast to Britain's inevitable protest of U.S. seizures outside
territorial waters, the Postal court noted that some states might not
object to U.S. seizures in violation of Article 6 of the High Seas Con-
vention. 140 Indeed, the record in Postal disclosed no protest from the
Grand Cayman Islands over the high-seas seizure of a vessel regis-
tered in the Islands that was transporting multiple tons of mari-
juana.141 Finding Article 6 to be executory would have allowed the
United States to engage in seizures in such situations (where seizure
would not sour foreign relations), whereas a conclusion that Article 6
was self-executing would have automatically divested the United
States of jurisdiction to conduct the seizure and resulting prosecution,
even in the absence of a protest.142 Interests in preserving the United
States' discretion to engage in noncontroversial seizures in violation of
Article 6 led the court to find Article 6 executory. 143
Intimately related to preserving foreign affairs discretion and
maintaining positive relations with other states, at least one other for-
eign affairs concern influences courts' self-execution analysis: a more
basic concern for the distribution of foreign affairs authority. The
D.C. Circuit, for example, concluded that a U.N. Security Council res-
olution, which restricted states' interactions with South Africa due to
139 Postal, 589 F.2d at 883; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 432 cmt. c (1987) (noting that if a state abducts a person in the terri-
tory of another state without consent, and "[i]f the state from which the person was abducted
does not demand his return, under the prevailing view the abducting state may proceed to prose-
cute him under its laws"). More recently, the Supreme Court has said that "it would appear that
a court must enforce [a self-executing treaty] on behalf of an individual regardless of the offen-
siveness of the practice of one nation to the other nation." United States v. Alvarez-Machain,
504 U.S. 655, 667 (1992).
140 Postal, 589 F.2d at 883.
141 Id. at 883-84; see id. at 866-68.
142 Id. at 884.
143 See id.
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its occupation of Namibia, was executory in part because the terms of
the resolution dealt "with the conduct of our foreign relations, an area
traditionally left to executive discretion."1" To the extent that en-
forcement of a treaty would lead the courts to disturb the distribution
of authority between the judiciary and political branches, a court is
more likely to find the treaty executory.
F. Alternative Enforcement Mechanisms
Finally, several courts have mentioned "the availability and feasi-
bility of alternative enforcement mechanisms" as a factor to consider
in self-execution analysis.145 Typically, this factor has received little
consideration. In People of Saipan v. United States Department of In-
terior,146 the Ninth Circuit noted in passing that the plaintiffs' alterna-
tive forum for pressing their treaty claim against the United States-
the Security Council-"would present to the plaintiffs obstacles so
great as to make their [treaty] rights virtually unenforceable." 147 Be-
cause the court "refuse[d] to leave the plaintiffs without a forum
which [could] hear their claim," the absence of adequate alternative
means of enforcing the treaty supported a finding of self-execution. 148
By contrast, the availability of a viable alternative enforcement mech-
anism would tend to render a treaty executory.
In sum, in determining whether a treaty is self-executing and
therefore enforceable in the absence of implementing legislation, U.S.
courts consider the intent of the political branches, specific definition,
mutuality, practical consequences, foreign relations effects, and alter-
native means of enforcement. If these factors point toward a finding
of self-execution, courts take the lead in applying a treaty as U.S. law.
If, instead, a treaty is non-self-executing, courts must wait for Con-
gress to render the treaty enforceable through implementing legisla-
tion. As a result, some, but not all, treaties are immediately
enforceable in U.S. courts.
144 Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
145 Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1985); Postal,
589 F.2d at 877; People of Saipan v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 97 (9th Cir. 1974).
146 People of Saipan v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974).
147 Id. at 97-98.
148 Id. at 100; see also Iwasawa, supra note 85, at 683 (citing, sometimes critically, additional
cases where alternative means of enforcement affected the self-execution analysis).
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IlL The Supreme Court's Treatment of CIL in Sosa
In contrast to this variable approach to judicial enforcement of
treaties, the scholarly majority has maintained that CIL is automati-
cally enforceable in federal courts as federal common law. 149 As
noted, this view has been contested by a minority of scholars who be-
lieve that the political branches must take the lead in incorporating
CIL.150 The Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain15' waded into
this debate, providing guidance on CIL's status in federal courts. The
guidance provided bears a striking resemblance to the analysis, just
discussed, that U.S. courts use to determine whether treaties are judi-
cially enforceable. The result of this confluence is the apparent emer-
gence of a unified, but as yet unnoticed, doctrine governing the status
of treaties and CIL as rules of decision applicable in federal courts
absent implementing legislation from Congress. The relief of this doc-
trine becomes visible as this Part charts the analysis of Sosa against
the background of the self-execution analysis outlined above.
In Sosa, the Supreme Court was faced with the cross-border ab-
duction of Mexican citizen Humberto Alvarez-Machain ("Alva-
rez").152 The abduction, approved by the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Agency ("DEA") in order to bring Alvarez to trial in the United
States for his alleged role in the murder of a DEA agent in Mexico,
was effected by Jose Francisco Sosa, also a Mexican citizen, who kid-
napped Alvarez in Mexico and delivered him to federal authorities in
Texas. 153 After Alvarez was tried and acquitted in the United States,
he returned to Mexico and brought suit against Sosa in a U.S. district
court under the ATS to recover from Sosa's alleged violation of the
law of nations. 154 The lower courts granted and upheld a damage
award on Alvarez's ATS claim, the Ninth Circuit asserting "that [the
ATS] not only provides federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction,
but also creates a cause of action for an alleged violation of the law of
nations."'' 55 The accuracy of this assertion was at the heart of the ATS
case before the Supreme Court.156 The Court ultimately agreed with
Sosa and the government that the ATS was a jurisdictional statute
149 See supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
150 See supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
151 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
152 Id. at 697-98.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 698.
155 Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 612 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), rev'd sub
nom. Sosa, 542 U.S. 692.
156 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712. The appeal to the Supreme Court also raised and resolved a
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only.157 However, this conclusion opened the door for the Court to
consider another question: whether federal courts nonetheless had au-
thority to recognize causes of action based on CIL.158
A. Intent of Congress
The Supreme Court answered this question by explaining that, as
a general rule, federal courts' authority to recognize causes of action
based on CIL turns on congressional intent. Historically, CIL was
treated as general common law, 159 part of the "brooding omnipres-
ence" 160 equally discoverable by federal and state courts and deriva-
tive of neither authority. 161 As a result, in the pre-Erie era in which
the ATS was enacted, federal courts were free to recognize causes of
action based on CIL, and the ATS assured jurisdiction to hear those
claims.1 62 Today, federal courts' authority is significantly different.
As the Court explained (in a primer on post-Erie federal common
law), "the prevailing conception of the common law has changed since
Federal Tort Claims Act issue that is not material to the subject of this Article. See id. at
699-712.
157 Id. at 712, 724; cf. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Bork, J., concurring) (concluding that the ATS "is merely a jurisdiction-granting statute and not
the implementing legislation required by non-self-executing treaties to enable individuals to en-
force their provisions").
158 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714.
159 See id. at 739 (Scalia, J., concurring in part); Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note
27 (noting pre-Sosa disagreement on this point, but explaining that Sosa clarified that CIL was
general law pre-Erie); Young, supra note 1, at 374 & n.43, 393-94 & n.143 (collecting and dis-
cussing authorities).
160 S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
161 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 740 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (noting that "the general com-
mon law was neither" state nor federal law); Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
notion, undergirding the general common law, that there exists "a transcendental body of law
outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute");
Bradley & Goldsmith, CIL as Federal Common Law, supra note 4, at 823-24, 852 (recounting
that prior to Erie, CIL was part of the transcendental general common law "that did not emanate
from a particular sovereign authority" and that was applied independently by state and federal
courts); Dodge, supra note 26, at 89-90 & n.14 ("There is widespread agreement that, when the
Constitution was adopted and the First Judiciary Act was passed, the law of nations was under-
stood to be general common law, which was binding on both federal and state courts."); Ku &
Yoo, supra note 2, at 202 (explaining that "[pirior to the seminal case of Erie, most scholars
agree that CIL formed part of the general common law" and, as a result, neither state nor fed-
eral courts were bound by the interpretations of the other); Leading Cases, supra note 26, at 451
("In 1789, the law of nations clearly was considered part of the general common law, that
'brooding omnipresence' recognized rather than created by federal and state judges alike."
(footnote omitted)).
162 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724; see also Ku & Yoo, supra note 2, at 202.
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1789 in a way that counsels restraint in judicially applying internation-
ally generated norms. ' 163 Today it is clear that common law "is not so
much found or discovered as it is either made or created." 164 In part
as a result of this new understanding of the nature of common law, the
authority of federal courts to create common law, and to apply CIL as
common law, is fundamentally different than it once was. Now, al-
though there exist "limited enclaves in which federal" common law
may be made, 165 "the general practice [is] to look for legislative gui-
dance before exercising innovative authority over substantive law. '166
This rule has been recognized repeatedly in the context of fashioning
common-law causes of action. 167 In that context, the rule serves to
ensure that important policy decisions, such as the proper means of
enforcing a law regulating primary conduct, are left to the legisla-
ture. 168 More generally, the rule serves to preserve a separation of
powers in which Congress retains principal lawmaking authority
within the federal government.
The Court made clear that this general rule applies even when
the common-law cause of action to be created is based on CIL, as
evidenced by its focus on whether the legislature had authorized fed-
eral courts to create common-law causes of action to be heard pursu-
ant to ATS jurisdiction. Had the Court believed that the federal
judiciary possessed unlimited authority to incorporate CIL into do-
mestic law, this focus on congressional authorization would have been
unnecessary. The Court simply could have stated that federal courts
have (a) common-law authority to create causes of action based on
CIL and (b) jurisdiction to hear such claims under either the ATS (on
the theory that the scope of ATS jurisdiction did not change merely
because federal courts now incorporate CIL as federal common law
rather than as general common law)169 or the general federal question
163 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 729; see also id. at 724-25, 729-30 & n.18 (noting that CIL is not "categorically
precluded" from incorporation as federal common law).
166 Id. at 726; see also id. at 741-42 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
167 Id. at 727; cf. Stephens, Corporate Liability, supra note 26, at 999 (reasoning that "[i]f
the Supreme Court considered the [ATS] as if it were enacted today .... the Court would likely
hold that it" creates jurisdiction but not a cause of action as "[tihe Court today does not infer
causes of action, but rather requires Congress to give specific authorization for such claims").
168 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727.
169 Cf. Leading Cases, supra note 26, at 453-54 (remarking that Sosa provides some support
for the view that CIL is "not necessarily incorporated within post-Erie federal common law," but
that courts retain CIL "lawmaking authority because the process of 'recognizing' (rather than
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statute.1 70 Indeed, Justice Scalia explicitly suggested that the general
federal question statute would work as well as the ATS not only as a
basis for jurisdiction,1 71 but also for the creation of common law based
on CIL, if there were "some [post-Erie] residual power ... to create
federal causes of action in cases implicating foreign relations. T172 But
the Court rejected the suggestion that federal courts may incorporate
CIL under the general federal question statute and explained that the
federal courts' authority to create new causes of action based on CIL
derived from Congress's unique intent in enacting the ATS. 173 That
creating) federal general common law before Erie [is] the same as the process of 'recognizing'
norms of [CIL] since then").
170 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 745 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring in part); Illinois v. City of Milwau-
kee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972); Bradley & Goldsmith, CIL as Federal Common Law, supra note 4,
at 847-48 & nn.210-11; Note, An Objection to Sosa-and to the New Federal Common Law, 119
HARV. L. REV. 2077, 2094 (2006).
171 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 745 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring in part); see also Stephens, Human
Rights Litigation, supra note 26, at 542 (recognizing that if CIL is federal law, the general federal
question statute would provide jurisdiction for CIL claims, rendering the ATS unnecessary).
The Sosa majority arguably did not respond to Justice Scalia's assertion that § 1331, the general
federal question statute, would be an equally good fount of jurisdiction for common-law causes
of action created under the congressional authorization implied from the ATS. Compare Sosa,
542 U.S. at 745 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring in part), with id. at 731 n.19 (majority opinion). Al-
though Professor Dodge has suggested that the majority did hold that § 1331 would not provide
jurisdiction for CIL-based causes of action, that conclusion seems to have resulted from confla-
tion of two questions: (a) whether the general federal question statute authorized the creation of
CIL-based common law (to which the majority responded in the negative as there was no indica-
tion of congressional intent to authorize such power pursuant to § 1331), and (b) whether the
general federal question statute can provide jurisdiction for common-law causes of action au-
thorized by Congress's intent behind the ATS (which the majority seemed to ignore). See
Dodge, supra note 26, at 96-97. This conflation leads to Professor Dodge's novel suggestion that
CIL "may be federal common law for purposes of the ATS, but not for the purposes of § 1331."
Id. at 97; see also id. at 100. Understanding the majority's focus on congressional intent as the
source of authority to create CIL-based common law eliminates the need to recognize such a
unique form of federal common law.
172 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 745 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
173 Id. at 731 n.19 (majority); see Swaine, supra note 26, at 1529 (arguing that Sosa's holding
was based on congressional delegation to the federal courts of "modest authority to reckon
[CIL]"); cf. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that, had Congress so intended, the ATS could "authorize tort suits for
the vindication of any international legal right"). Thus, although the Court recognized that in
Erie's wake there are "limited enclaves" of acceptable federal-common-law-making and that
Supreme Court precedent treating international law as part of U.S. law does not "preclude"
federal courts from ever recognizing as federal common law "international norms intended to
protect individuals," Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729-30 & n.18; see also id. at 724-25, the Court did not
suggest that federal courts have independent authority to incorporate CIL as common law.
Rather, the Court indicated that the authority to engage in such common-law-making derives, as
a rule, from Congress. See, e.g., id. at 726. The Court's reliance on the unique intent behind the
ATS does, however, raise questions about when a jurisdictional grant may evince an intent to
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intent was discerned through an extensive analysis of the motives of
both the First and subsequent Congresses.174
The First Congress included the ATS within the Judiciary Act of
1789.175 As originally enacted, the ATS provided federal district
courts "cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or
the circuit courts,. . . of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. ' 176 The
ATS's inclusion in the Judiciary Act, which otherwise exclusively ad-
dressed federal jurisdiction; the use of the term "cognizance," which
"bespoke a grant of jurisdiction, not power to mold substantive law";
and the fact that the First Congress would have been aware of "the
distinction between jurisdiction and a cause of action" all led to the
easy conclusion that the ATS "was intended as jurisdictional. '177
That conclusion did not preclude an implied intent that federal
courts recognize causes of action based on CIL, however. 178 The
Court therefore turned to assessing whether Congress impliedly au-
thorized federal courts to create common-law causes of action based
on CIL.179 The history surrounding the ATS was sparse and equivo-
cal, but permitted the Court to draw two inferences regarding Con-
gress's intent.180 First, Congress did not intend the ATS to lie fallow
until some future Congress or state provided or authorized the crea-
tion of a cause of'action that could be heard pursuant to ATS jurisdic-
tion.181 Second, "Congress intended the ATS to furnish jurisdiction
confer common-law-making authority. See Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 27; Lead-
ing Cases, supra note 26, at 455-56.
174 See Stephens, Human Rights Litigation, supra note 26, at 543 ("The Supreme Court
resolved the debate [regarding the ATS's import] by working carefully through the available
information about the intent of those who enacted the statute."); id. at 549.
175 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712.
176 Id. at 712-13 (quoting Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 23, 77).
177 Id. at 713-14; cf Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 810 (Bork, J., concurring).
178 This is where the majority and Justice Scalia (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Thomas) part company. While the majority believed that the intent of the First and
subsequent Congresses could survive Erie to allow federal courts to recognize new, though lim-
ited, CIL-based causes of action, Justice Scalia believed that the wholly different nature of post-
Erie common law precluded such a finding. Compare Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724-25, 729-31, with id.
at 744-46 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). Cf. Dodge, supra note 26, at 95-96.
179 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714.
180 See id. at 718-19 (noting that "[tlhere is no record of congressional discussion about
private actions that might be subject to" ATS jurisdiction "or about any need for further legisla-
tion to create private remedies," and that scholarly debate has yielded no "consensus under-
standing of what Congress intended").
181 Id. at 719; see also id. at 720-21.
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for a relatively modest set of [common-law] actions alleging violations
of the law of nations."' 82
The First Congress's intent that federal courts recognize a limited
number of common-law causes of action based on the law of nations
was easy to achieve at the time the ATS was enacted, as federal courts
could legitimately apply CIL as general federal common law. 83 In
light of Erie, however, federal courts no longer enjoy that authority.' 84
Erie's restriction of federal judicial authority, however, did not defeat
the First Congress's intent.185 The Court concluded that that intent
survived Erie and continued to provide authority for limited recogni-
tion of CIL-based common law, particularly given the intent of more
recent Congresses. 186
182 Id. at 720; see id. at 721. The historical evidence supporting these inferences included
the following: (a) at the time the ATS was enacted, the law of nations recognized three offenses
that could be judicially enforced against individuals-"violation of safe conducts, infringement
of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy"-which were probably what the ATS drafters had in
mind when they referred to suits by aliens for torts in violation of the law of nations, id. at 715;
(b) these violations had been of special concern in the United States because the lack of a cen-
tralized government authorized to provide judicial remedies for these violations had given rise to
foreign relations concerns in the period following independence through the Articles of Confed-
eration, id. at 715-17 & n.11; (c) as a result of this lack of authority, and to ameliorate its conse-
quences, the Continental Congress twice called on states to enforce rights based on the law of
nations, id. at 716-17; (d) the concern over the centralized government's inability to enforce the
law of nations persisted in the Constitutional Convention, which drafted a Constitution "vesting
the Supreme Court with original jurisdiction over 'all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
ministers and Consuls,"' id. at 717 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2); (e) similarly, the First
Congress not only enacted the ATS but also recognized the three offenses above as criminal,
reinforced the Supreme Court's "original jurisdiction over suits brought by diplomats," and au-
thorized alienage jurisdiction, id. at 717; (f) the presumed principal drafter of the ATS had been
in both the Continental Congress that first called for state enforcement of the law of nations and
the one state legislature that responded to the call, id. at 719; (g) the Attorney General in 1795
opined that the ATS opened the federal courts to a tort suit, presumably based on common-law
causes of action, "against Americans who had taken part in the French plunder of a British slave
colony in Sierra Leone," id. at 721; and (h) a district court decision from the same year suggested
that some torts in violation of the law of nations fell within the common law and were subject to
ATS jurisdiction, while a district court decision in 1793 held that the ATS could not provide
jurisdiction for a suit not based only on tort, but did not suggest that additional legislation would
be necessary to confer jurisdiction in a suit seeking only tort recovery, id. at 720. Some have
criticized the Court's historical evidence as very weak. See Ku & Yoo, supra note 2, at 171.
183 See Stephens, Corporate Liability, supra note 26, at 999 ("It seems. . . clear that, during
the late eighteenth century, members of Congress would not have seen any need to explicitly
create a cause of action for international law violations because they understood that such claims
could be based on common law.").
184 See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
185 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 730-31.
186 Id.; see also Stephens, Corporate Liability, supra note 26, at 999 (noting that the Court
in Sosa tried to effectuate the intent of the First Congress despite intervening changes in our
legal system).
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More recent Congresses, like the First Congress, have implied an
intent to allow federal courts to recognize limited causes of action that
fit within the ATS's jurisdictional grant.187 Following the Second Cir-
cuit's 1980 decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,188 federal courts assumed
authority to recognize causes of action based on the law of nations.189
Judicial disagreement with this practice was joined in 1984 when Judge
Bork, in the D.C. Circuit's fractured opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic,190 concluded that the ATS was a jurisdictional statute
and did not create a cause of action.191 In the two decades since these
opinions, Congress has never expressed disagreement with the deci-
sions arising from Filartiga.192 Instead, in the wake of the D.C. Cir-
cuit's dismissal of the ATS suit in Tel-Oren, Congress enacted the
Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA"),193 which explicitly creates
federal causes of action for extrajudicial killing and torture.1 94 The
legislative history to the TVPA states that the ATS "should remain
intact to permit suits based on other norms that already exist or may
ripen in the future into rules of customary international law. ' 195
Although this history suggests that modern Congresses intended
to allow some federal-common-law incorporation of CIL, the Su-
preme Court did not find a "congressional mandate to seek out and
define new and debatable violations of the law of nations" or that
modern Congresses had provided affirmative encouragement of
"greater judicial creativity" in incorporating CIL.196 Indeed, the Court
noted that in spite of the encouraging statement in the TVPA's legisla-
tive history, "Congress as a body has done nothing to promote" ATS
suits based on CIL norms beyond the prohibitions on torture and ex-
trajudicial killings. 197 Moreover, the Senate has several times "ex-
pressly declined to give the federal courts the task of interpreting and
187 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731.
188 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
189 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724-25; see supra note 7.
190 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
191 Id. at 810-11 (Bork, J., concurring); see Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731. But cf Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d
at 811, 813-16 & n.22 (Bork, J., concurring) (suggesting that Congress, in enacting the ATS, may
have recognized that the three paradigm offenses discussed in Sosa carried "with them a private
cause of action for which" the ATS provided federal jurisdiction).
192 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731.
193 Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000)).
194 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728.
195 H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86.
196 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728.
197 Id.
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applying international human rights law," as when it ratified the
ICCPR subject to a declaration "that the substantive provisions of the
document were not self-executing.' 198
The Court welcomed further guidance from Congress, recogniz-
ing that Congress could entirely prohibit federal courts from incorpo-
rating CIL as federal common law "(explicitly or implicitly by treaties
or statutes that occupy the field) just as it may modify or cancel any
judicial decision so far as it rests on recognizing an international norm
as such."'199 However, the Court had to decide Sosa based on the evi-
dence of congressional intent before it. Given the available evidence
of the First and modern Congresses' intent, the Court held that fed-
eral courts could continue to recognize limited CIL-based causes of
action that coincide with the ATS's jurisdictional grant. 200
The broader and more critical point, however, is that the Court
required a finding of congressional intent before permitting the com-
mon-law incorporation of CIL. Sosa thus stands for the proposition
that, as a rule, congressional intent is the threshold for federal judicial
authority to apply CIL as federal law,20 1 just as the intent of the politi-
198 Id.; see also id. at 747 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
199 Id. at 731 (majority opinion).
200 See id. at 712 (finding, based on the First Congress's "limited, implicit sanction" of fed-
eral courts' authority "to entertain the handful of international law cum common law claims
understood in 1789," no authority to recognize broader common-law causes of action exists to-
day); id. at 724-28; cf Charles W. Brower II, Calling All NGOs: A Discussion of the Continuing
Vitality of the Alien Tort Statute as a Tool in the Fight for International Human Rights in the Wake
of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 26 WHITrIER L. REV. 929, 941-42, 944, 946-48 (2005) (acknowledg-
ing that the Sosa Court found congressional authorization to recognize CIL-based causes of
action, while arguing that Congress's authorization was broader than what the Court actually
found).
As the Sosa opinion illustrates, "[ilt may not always be easy to determine whether the politi-
cal branches have authorized the development of a federal common law rule concerning CIL."
Bradley & Goldsmith, CIL as Federal Common Law, supra note 4, at 869. Congress, of course,
may provide clarity by expressly enacting causes of action based on CIL, as it did in the TVPA,
rather than merely delegating authority to do so. See Kathleen Kim & Kusia Hreshchyshyn,
Human Trafficking Private Right of Action: Civil Rights for Trafficked Persons in the United
States, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 33-34 (2004) (arguing that Congress's creation of a private
right of action for victims of human trafficking eliminates concerns raised by Sosa); supra note
193 and accompanying text.
201 Even scholars who would continue to assert that "[rIecognition and enforcement of in-
ternational law as a matter of federal common law without specific legislative authorization does
not overstep the proper judicial role" should acknowledge that "the existence of the ATS and
the history of congressional activity and inactivity in relation to the growth of ATS litigation
provided at least some legislative countenance to the federal common law role" approved in
Sosa and limit Sosa's value as an endorsement of federal authority to create CIL-based common
law in the absence of congressional authorization. Neuman, supra note 26, at 129; see also id. at
132-33, 135, 152; Anupam Chander, Globalization and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1193, 1205-07
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cal branches is the touchstone of judicial authority to apply a treaty as
federal law. Moreover, as with self-execution, considerations besides
evidence directly probative of congressional intent bear on the courts'
authority to incorporate CIL. The Court in Sosa identified several
such factors.
B. Specific Definition and Mutuality
In obvious parallel to self-execution analysis, the first two factors
the Court identified were specific definition and mutuality. 2 2 The
Court held that "federal courts should not recognize private claims
under federal common law for violations of any international law
norm with less definite content[, i.e., specific definition,] and accept-
ance among civilized nations[, i.e., mutuality,] than the historical para-
digms familiar when [the ATS] was enacted. 20 3 These specificity and
mutuality requirements proved fatal to Alvarez's ATS claim.2°4 Alva-
rez, according to the Court, 2 5 relied on "a general prohibition of 'arbi-
trary' detention defined as officially sanctioned action exceeding
positive authorization to detain under the domestic law of some gov-
ernment, regardless of the circumstances. ' 20 6 Alvarez could only
demonstrate, however, acceptance of "a norm against arbitrary deten-
tion ... at a high level of generality. '20 7 To the extent the Restate-
ment provided support for a more specific rule-a rule against state-
sanctioned "'prolonged arbitrary detention'"-even that rule would
not sufficiently specify when a policy of prolonged arbitrary detention
(2005) (arguing that Sosa definitively endorses federal courts' authority to incorporate CIL as
federal common law, while acknowledging that Sosa "carefully moors the elaboration of the
federal common law in the authorization of the (ATS]"); Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 2253-55,
2259, 2272-74 (arguing that Congress authorized creation of CIL-based common law pursuant to
the ATS, even while asserting that Sosa rejected the minority view that CIL was not federal
common law); Stephens, Human Rights Litigation, supra note 26, at 548-50 (same). This Part
has demonstrated that the Sosa Court's focus on legislative intent was far more than empirical
happenstance, however. Congressional intent was central to the Court's assessment of the pro-
priety of common-law incorporation.
202 Although these are separate factors, the Court treated them as interlocking require-
ments, see Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725, and they raise common concerns that may be addressed to-
gether. Accordingly, I discuss them together in this Part.
203 Id. at 732; see id. at 724; cf Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 805-08
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (arguing that the fact that the international law norms on
which plaintiffs relied were "anything but clearly defined" or well accepted counseled against
recognition of a cause of action).
204 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
205 Commentators have argued that the Court's characterization of Alvarez's claim was
miserly at best. See Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 2253, 2281-82.
206 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 736.
207 Id. at 736 n.27.
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would render its enforcers "enemies of the human race" and would
certainly require something more than Alvarez's "relatively brief de-
tention in excess of positive authority. ' 20 8 Thus, "the broad [norm of
CIL] Alvarez advance[d]" was at present "an aspiration" lacking the
required specificity.20 9 Absent specificity and mutuality, the federal
courts could not provide a common-law remedy; as with treaties, spe-
cific definition and mutuality considerations served to cabin federal
courts' authority to apply CIL as a federal rule of decision.
One might argue that the specific definition and mutuality limita-
tions on the federal application of CIL (a) are born of the historical
context in which the ATS was enacted and (b) only apply to ATS
claims.210 There is some basis for the former contention, as the speci-
ficity and mutuality limitations certainly emanate from congressional
intent with regard to the ATS. The paradigm offenses, according to
the Court, were accepted as part of the law of nations at the time the
ATS was enacted and were likely the offenses the ATS-drafters had in
mind when providing jurisdiction for torts in violation of the law of
nations.211 The First Congress only intended to provide federal juris-
diction to hear these three claims, or at least a narrow set of such
claims.212 Modern Congresses have approved of federal courts' recog-
nition of other causes of action, but that recognition has been subject
to limiting standards like those the Sosa Court adopted.213 Thus, one
might conclude that the specificity and mutuality standards that Sosa
imposed, as informed by the paradigm offenses, were simply man-
dated by congressional intent. To the extent that is true, the Court's
adoption of these standards is a further manifestation of the principle
that congressional intent is the touchstone of CIL incorporation.
208 Id. at 737 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 702 (1987)).
209 Id. at 738.
210 See Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 2250 (arguing that the three paradigm offenses "clearly
inform[ ] the rule of evidence that should govern future ATS proceedings").
211 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715.
212 Id. at 720.
213 Id. at 730-33; see id. at 747-51 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (criticizing the Court for
using the same standards that "ambitious lower courts have used"); Brower, supra note 200, at
939 ("The rule stated in Sosa is essentially no different than the rule stated in Filartiga over
twenty years prior."); Dodge, supra note 26, at 87, 94 ("[T]he restraint imposed by the Sosa
Court[ ] was no more than the lower courts had already been exercising in cases under the
ATS."); Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 2245, 2250-51 (asserting that the limitations imposed by the
Sosa Court were consistent with those employed by lower courts); Stephens, Human Rights Liti-
gation, supra note 26, at 534-35, 551-55 (remarking that the tone and standard adopted by Sosa
mirror the approach of Filartiga and most of its progeny); cf Brav, supra note 26, at 266, 272
(arguing that Sosa endorsed "a slightly more restricted version of Filartiga").
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However, congressional intent is only part of the story behind the
Supreme Court's imposition of the specific definition and mutuality
considerations. Indeed, had the Court felt obliged to impose limita-
tions solely to respect the intent of (at least the First) Congress, it
presumably would have permitted recognition only of causes of action
in situations where a failure to do so would strain U.S. relations with
other countries (again with the three specified offenses as para-
digms),2 14 for it was the national government's inability to respond to
international law violations damaging foreign relations that motivated
enactment of the ATS. 215 But the specificity and mutuality standards
arguably do not derive solely from the ATS. They are part of a
broader analysis that applies to the incorporation question generally,
as is evidenced by the fact that these standards (a) are inspired by
separation of powers concerns independent from the ATS and (b)
serve to address those concerns whenever common-law incorporation
is at issue.
The specificity and mutuality considerations arose from the Sosa
Court's fidelity to the post-Erie distribution of lawmaking authority
between Congress and the federal courts.216 Indeed, the Court de-
cided against Alvarez precisely because "[c]reating a private cause of
action to further [the broad norm Alvarez advanced] would go be-
yond any residual common law discretion [the Court thought] appro-
priate to exercise. '21 7 As the Court explained, Erie concerns provide
"good reasons" for restraining "the discretion a federal
214 See Ku & Yoo, supra note 2, at 178-79 (commenting that "[wihile [the Sosa Court]
looked to the diplomatic problem that had beset the national government under the Articles of
Confederation, it rejected the idea that the ATS should be so limited" and, indeed, transformed
the purpose of the ATS "from keeping the United States out of diplomatic incidents to keeping
other nations to their international obligations"). But cf Memorandum for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 22, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090) (arguing
that when "there is a consensus in the international community that [a] right is protected and
that there is a widely shared understanding of the scope of this protection[,] . . .there is little
danger that judicial enforcement will impair our foreign policy efforts").
215 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 716-18; Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 812,
815-16 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
216 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725-28. While the Sosa Court focused on the proper distribution
of federal lawmaking authority, the specificity and mutuality concerns also serve to police the
distribution of foreign affairs authority among the federal branches. See Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) ("[T]he greater the degree of codification or consen-
sus concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary
to render decisions regarding it, since courts can then focus on the application of an agreed
principle ... rather than on the sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the
national interest or with international justice.").
217 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 738; see also id. at 738 n.29 (asserting that lack of specificity is a clear
"point against the creation by judges of a private cause of action to enforce the aspiration behind
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court . . . exercise[s] in considering a new cause of action" based on
CIL.218 Those concerns, which arise whenever CIL is incorporated as
federal common law, are mitigated by the specific definition and mu-
tuality requirements.219
At a basic level, specific definition and mutuality serve to ensure
that federal courts do not incorporate norms that have not yet quali-
fied as CIL.220 But these requirements do more than that; they also
serve to limit the discretion courts may exercise even when the tradi-
tional definition of CIL is arguably satisfied.2 21 CIL results from the
"general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a
sense of legal obligation. ' 22 The inherent difficulty of identifying
norms that satisfy this definition leaves room for significant discretion
in recognizing claims based on CIL.2 3 Requiring widespread accept-
the rule claimed"); id. at 733 n.21 (noting that the specific-definition requirement was dispositive
of Alvarez's claim).
218 Id. at 725.
219 See id, at 726.
220 See id. at 738 n.29 (finding that lack of specificity "is evidence against [a norm's] status
as binding law"); Neuman, supra note 26, at 131 (positing that the limitations imposed by Sosa,
including the specificity requirement, suggest that "federal courts should be followers, not lead-
ers, in the development of [CIL]"); Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 2267 ("[T]he 'specific, universal,
and obligatory' standard enables courts to distinguish genuinely customary norms from merely
idiosyncratic or aspirational norms.").
221 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 738 n.29; Grace C. Spencer, Comment, Her Body Is a Battlefield:
The Applicability of the Alien Tort Statute to Corporate Human Rights Abuses in Juarez, Mexico,
40 GONZ. L. REV. 503, 530 (2005) (noting that the restrictions Sosa placed on CIL claims "are far
narrower than the modern understanding of customary international law").
222 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) (1987).
223 See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Ed-
wards, J., concurring) (recognizing the "awesome duty" placed on federal courts attempting "to
derive from an amorphous entity-i.e., the 'law of nations'-standards of liability applicable in
concrete situations"); Bradley & Goldsmith, CIL as Federal Common Law, supra note 4, at
854-55 (rejecting the notion "that judges 'find' rather than 'make' CIL," given "CIL's 'soft,
indeterminate character"' (quoting Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VAL-
UES 29 (1995))); J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L.
449, 451, 459 (2000) (arguing, inter alia, that CIL is "a matter of taste," a servant of "many
masters because its elements, state practice and opinio juris, have no ascertainable meaning and
are routinely ignored"); Ku & Yoo, supra note 2, at 184-86 (detailing numerous difficulties in
identifying CIL); Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 2245, 2251 (describing the process by which courts
identify CIL as "irreducibly impressionistic" and "inherently discretionary"); Swaine, supra note
26, at 1526-28 & n.134 ("Those assigned to construe [CIL] have so many sources from which to
draw, and so few constraints, that the task of discovery and application is hard to distinguish
from lawmaking."); Young, supra note 1, at 385-91, 396-98 (discussing concerns with CIL that
undercut the notion that judges merely discern established CIL norms). But cf Chander, supra
note 201, at 1209 (arguing that the judiciary is the branch of government best suited to "review
the difficult plethora of legal materials that constitute international law"); Koh, supra note 4, at
1853 (arguing that when federal courts make common law based on CIL, they "exercise less
The George Washington Law Review
ance of specifically defined norms reduces the scope of that discre-
tion.224 Specific definition helps to ensure that the norms courts
incorporate provide judicially enforceable standards rather than allow
courts to fill abstract principles with their own content.
Similarly, mutuality ensures that courts do not take the lead in
enforcing norms that as yet remain underrecognized by other states.
Certainly there are times when the United States should endorse as
CIL and adopt as domestic law standards that have not yet achieved
extensive acceptance internationally. But the decision to bind the
United States without mutuality of commitment from other states is a
judgment best left to the political branches.225 As with treaties, it is
less controversial for a court to bind the United States to international
norms that have been mutually recognized as obligatory by a large
number of other states. 226
In short, the specificity and mutuality considerations the Supreme
Court adopted are not exclusive to ATS litigation. Although they are
critical to ATS litigation and were key to resolving Alvarez's ATS
claim, the reason the Court imposed them and their general utility
suggest that they are intended to guide incorporation of CIL by fed-
eral courts whether pursuant to the ATS or otherwise.
The specificity and mutuality considerations imposed on CIL in-
corporation obviously mirror the considerations involved in self-exe-
cution analysis. Moreover, as in self-execution analysis, specificity
and mutuality are not the only considerations the Court adopted to
guide incorporation of CIL. Because specificity and mutuality con-
judicial discretion than when making other kinds of federal common law, as their task is not to
create rules willy-nilly, but rather to discern rules of decision from an existing corpus of [CIL]
rules").
224 These requirements would, as one example, prevent courts from applying a norm of
CIL to an innovative defendant without assurance that such application had become well-ac-
cepted in CIL. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732-33 & n.20.
225 Cf Note, supra note 26, at 2391-92, 2395-98 (arguing that Congress, under the Offences
Clause, possesses legislative authority to incorporate norms of CIL that fall short of the specific-
ity and mutuality required for common-law incorporation).
226 Cf Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980) ("It is only where the nations
of the world have demonstrated that the wrong is of mutual, and not merely several, concern, by
means of express international accords, that a wrong generally recognized becomes an interna-
tional law violation within the meaning of the [ATS].").
This is not to suggest that courts may incorporate all CIL norms that have reached a certain
level of specificity and acceptance. Courts' authority to incorporate still depends on congres-
sional intent and the other considerations detailed in this Part. But in cases where congressional
intent is present and other considerations do not militate against incorporation, incorporation
will raise fewer separation of powers concerns where the norm incorporated is both specifically
defined and mutually accepted by a large number of states.
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cerns were sufficient to dispose of Alvarez's claim, the Sosa Court did
not discuss these other considerations in great detail, but did identify
them and gave some sense of their content.227
C. Practical Consequences
The Court held that in deciding whether it is appropriate to incor-
porate CIL as federal common law-as in deciding whether to apply a
treaty as self-executing-federal courts must consider the practical
consequences of doing so.228 Indeed, the Sosa Court noted that con-
sideration of practical consequences is inevitable in analyzing specific-
ity.229 The Court concluded that Alvarez's alleged norm was
insufficiently specific in part because "its implications would be
breathtaking. '230 If the Court recognized, as Alvarez urged, a cause of
action for "officially sanctioned action exceeding positive authoriza-
tion to detain under the domestic law of some government, regardless
of the circumstances" attending the detention, that cause of action
would encompass "any arrest, anywhere in the world" that was "unau-
thorized by the law of the jurisdiction in which it took place."231 "It
would create an action in federal courts for arrests by state officers
who simply exceed their authority"-"the reckless policeman who
botches his warrant. ' 232 It would create a claim "for the violation of
any limit that the law of any country might place on the authority of
its own officers to arrest. ' 233 And if the cause of action were inter-
preted to cover detentions by nongovernmental actors, the conse-
quences would be even more far-reaching. The expansive
consequences of incorporating Alvarez's alleged norm of CIL per-
suaded the Court that such lawmaking by the federal judiciary would
be improper. While the Court in Sosa analyzed these practical conse-
quences as a subset of the specific-definition requirement, practical
consequences bear independent weight in the incorporation analysis,
227 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21 (noting that the "requirement of clear definition is not
meant to be the only principle limiting the availability of relief in the federal courts for violations
of [CIL], though it disposes of this action").
228 See id. at 727-28, 732-33 (expressing concern for "the possible collateral consequences"
of applying CIL in federal courts without express authorization); id. at 746 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part); cf Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 812 (Bork, J., concurring) (rejecting as "too sweeping" an
interpretation of the ATS that "would authorize tort suits for the vindication of any international
legal right").
229 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732-33.
230 Id. at 736.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 737.
233 Id.
2006]
The George Washington Law Review
as even a specifically defined norm might produce consequences that
would counsel against incorporation absent clearer congressional
intent.
D. Foreign Relations Effects
As in self-execution analysis, one practical consequence plays a
particular role in CIL incorporation analysis: the Sosa Court empha-
sized that "the potential implications for the foreign relations of the
United States of recognizing [private claims for violations of CIL]
should make courts particularly wary of impinging on the discretion of
the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing foreign af-
fairs.''234 As this statement intimates, CIL incorporation might nega-
tively impact U.S. relations with other states, the political branches'
range of discretion to conduct foreign affairs, and the distribution of
foreign affairs authority between the political branches and the judici-
ary. Courts must weigh these concerns in deciding whether to incor-
porate norms of CIL, just as courts weigh these concerns in
conducting self-execution analysis.
Consistent with this principle, the Sosa Court took specific note
of the foreign relations impact of incorporating CIL in ATS suits,
which involve federal courts in identifying "limits on the power of for-
eign governments over their own citizens," and in holding "that a for-
eign government or its agent has transgressed those limits. '235
Notwithstanding the potential good done by these suits, they "raise
risks of adverse foreign policy consequences. 2 36 As a result, federal
courts should undertake these suits, "if at all, with great caution" and
sensitivity to their foreign relations impact.237
The Sosa Court also indicated that federal courts might need to
defer to the political branches' foreign affairs assessment in appropri-
ate cases.238 For example, the U.S. executive agreed with the govern-
ment of South Africa that ATS class action suits brought in the United
States against corporations allegedly complicit in apartheid interfere
with the response to apartheid that South Africa has chosen: an ap-
proach emphasizing confession and forgiveness rather than judicial
234 Id. at 727; see also id. at 747 (Scalia, J., concurring in part); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 804-06 & n.12 (Bork, J., concurring) (arguing that potential negative
impact on foreign affairs counseled against both judicial recognition of a private cause of action
and the existence of a private cause of action under international law).
235 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727; see also id. at 746-47 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
236 Id. at 728 (majority opinion).
237 Id.
238 Id. at 733 n.21.
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penalties. 239 "In such cases," the Court explained, "there is a strong
argument that federal courts should give serious weight to the Execu-
tive Branch's view of the case's impact on foreign policy.24 °
While the Court suggested that this deference was a separate con-
sideration, it appears simply to be a manifestation of the foreign rela-
tions concerns, noted above, that figure into incorporation analysis.
To preserve the political branches' authority to conduct foreign affairs
as they see fit, and because the political branches are often more com-
petent at assessing foreign relations' impact, courts sometimes must
defer to the political branches' foreign relations calculations:241 in the
South African context, the executive's assessment of the impact the
litigation would have on U.S.-South Africa relations and the execu-
tive's conclusion that such an impact would not be in our interest. 242
E. Alternative Enforcement Mechanisms
In addition to identifying foreign relations considerations as part
of the incorporation analysis, the Sosa Court concluded that federal
courts might restrict incorporation in cases where international law
requires exhaustion of remedies in local and perhaps international
tribunals before a plaintiff raises "a claim in a foreign forum. 2 43 On
one level, respect for an international exhaustion requirement might
be a manifestation of the specific-definition requirement. That is,
courts should only recognize claims that are sufficiently specific and
then should only recognize them as specified. If a claim is subject to
an exhaustion requirement in international law, it should not be incor-
porated without that limitation. On another level, the Court's solici-
tude toward an international exhaustion requirement manifests an
independent consideration in the incorporation analysis: the availabil-
ity of alternative means of enforcement. If CIL claims are capable of
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 But cf Stephens, Human Rights Litigation, supra note 26, at 561-67 (suggesting that
courts must not simply defer to the executive's foreign affairs assessment when it is counterfac-
tual, and asserting that "the Sosa opinion makes no mention at all of the executive branch's
views of the case or of its overwrought description of the supposed danger that ATS cases pose
to U.S. foreign policy").
242 Following Sosa, the district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the ATS claims raised
in the apartheid litigation, relying in part on the U.S. government's representation "that the
adjudication of this suit would cause tension between the United States and South Africa and
would serve to hamper the policy of encouraging positive change in developing countries via
economic investment." In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 553 (S.D.N.Y.
2004); see also id. at 554.
243 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21.
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enforcement in another forum, the federal judiciary would be less jus-
tified in incorporating them for enforcement in federal courts, just as
federal courts would be less justified in applying a treaty as self-exe-
cuting if the treaty contemplated enforcement through alternative
means.
IV. Uniformity and Its Implications
As the above discussion acknowledges, the Supreme Court in
Sosa did not explicitly state that common-law incorporation of CIL is
governed by the same standards as self-execution of treaties. Indeed,
the Court's somewhat scattered identification of the considerations
that constrain judicial incorporation of CIL suggests that the Court
may not have been aware that it was prescribing the same factors that
have guided self-execution analysis. However, even a cursory com-
parison of the considerations involved in self-execution analysis and
those imposed by Sosa to guide CIL incorporation reveals almost per-
fect correlation. In both contexts, the political branches' intent is the
keystone of the analysis. Considerations of specific definition, mutu-
ality, practical consequences, foreign relations effects, and alternative
enforcement mechanisms also factor in. It appears, then, that the
Court has discovered and outlined the elements of a uniform doctrine
governing the status of both sources of international law in federal
courts.
True, there are some differences between the analyses for treaties
and CIL. For example, Congress's intent is often paramount in deter-
mining whether CIL may be incorporated as federal common law,
while both Congress's and the executive branch's intent are regularly
relevant in determining whether an international agreement is self-
executing.2"4 But this difference merely reflects the allocation of U.S.
lawmaking authority with respect to the two primary sources of inter-
national law. The Constitution and historical practice assign a role to
both Congress and the executive in fashioning international agree-
ments as federal law,24 5 while Congress possesses primary authority to
incorporate CIL via federal statutes, either under its power to define
and punish violations of the law of nations or its other legislative pow-
ers.246 To the extent the executive acts to incorporate CIL through
regulation or proclamation, the executive's intent may be relevant as
244 See supra Part II.A.
245 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the President, with the agreement of the
Senate, the power to make treaties); CARTER, TRIMBLE & BRADLEY, supra note 43, at 209-10.
246 See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 8.
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well.247 Consequently, the variable focus on the intent of one or both
of the political branches ultimately is a distinction without a
difference.
At heart, the analysis for both treaties and CIL serves the same
purpose: to safeguard the authority of the political branches who are
charged with primary responsibility for enacting federal law and con-
ducting foreign affairs.2 48 Thus, whether the considerations beyond in-
tent are perceived as evidence of, or presumptions regarding,
Congress's intent, or simply as analytical safeguards to prevent federal
courts from overstepping their authority, the factors at bottom seek to
police the proper distribution of power between the federal judiciary
and the relevant political branches.2 49
Because the motive behind the analysis for both treaties and CIL
includes preservation of a proper separation of powers, it is not sur-
prising that the Court turned to the same considerations in both con-
texts, even if unknowingly.250 Indeed, perhaps what is more surprising
247 See Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 27.
248 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724-33; Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918)
(stating that the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs is constitutionally assigned to the political
branches); Iwasawa, supra note 85, at 672 (noting the separation of powers function of a specific
definition requirement); Vdzquez, supra note 12, at 695-96, 712-15, 717 & n.102, 722-23 (noting
the "domestic allocation-of-powers function" of the self-execution doctrine generally, and of
specific considerations in the self-execution analysis).
249 Cf. Steven M. Schneebaum, The Paquete Habana Sails On: International Law in U.S.
Courts After Sosa, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 81, 101-02 (2005) (noting the separation of powers
function of considerations the Sosa Court adopted). Thus, the Court's concern for both congres-
sional intent and the additional considerations is not merely a schizophrenic attempt to bridge
past and present, to "give effect ... to the expectations of the First Congress while also taking
seriously more modern concerns" of the U.S. legal system, as has been asserted. Dodge, supra
note 26, at 99; see id. at 88-89, 97-100. Nor are the additional factors inconsistent with the
concern for intent, as has likewise been suggested. See Vdzquez, supra note 12, at 711, 715-16
(decrying courts' consideration of factors beyond intent in analyzing self-execution). Instead,
consideration of the political branches' intent and the other factors identified yields a more com-
prehensive approach for policing the proper separation of powers between the political branches
and the judiciary.
Whether considerations beyond intent might be better assessed under a separate doctrinal
banner is beyond the scope of this Article. For one commentator's views on this issue, see id. at
711-14, 722-23; Vizquez, supra note 35, at 1119-22.
250 These considerations, of course, can lead to different conclusions, depending on one's
conception of the appropriate separation of powers. In Sosa, for example, while considerations
such as the intent of modern Congresses and the potential foreign affairs effect of recognizing a
private cause of action led the majority to find limited authority to create common-law claims
based on CIL, these same considerations convinced Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia
and Thomas that federal courts lacked that authority altogether. Compare Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724,
728-31, with id. at 746-47 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). In Justice Scalia's view, the majority's
position was inconsistent with the method "[w]e Americans have ... for making the laws that are
over us." Id. at 750.
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is that the Court did not explicitly acknowledge the parity of concerns
that underlie judicial application of treaties and CIL and expressly
adopt the same analysis for both. What the Court failed to do in
terms, however, it did in practice, laying the groundwork for recogni-
tion of a uniform doctrine for both treaties and CIL.
The implications of this emerging uniformity are significant. At a
basic level, uniformity promises to simplify the status of international
law in federal courts. As noted, international law's status in federal
courts has been the subject of much debate and confusion. Sosa sug-
gests that we may be on the eve of greater clarity and simplicity.
Soon, it seems, we might speak in terms of the federal status of inter-
national law generally, rather than the separate statuses of treaties
and CIL, and have resort to a uniform doctrine to guide our discus-
sion. This is not to say that the doctrine is fully developed.251 To the
contrary, many questions remain, 252 but the basic contours of this uni-
fying doctrine have emerged in Sosa.
Perhaps equally important, the emerging uniformity suggests that
academic commentary on the domestic status of international law is
significantly out of step with Supreme Court jurisprudence. As noted
above, academic commentators have questioned the self-execution
doctrine and criticized the political branches' use of non-self-execut-
ing declarations. 253 Nonetheless, the Court in Sosa deferred to the
non-self-executing declaration attached to the ICCPR, and not only
affirmed the self-execution doctrine 254 but also extended its core con-
251 Indeed, the Court in Sosa suggested that additional, but unidentified, factors may be
relevant in evaluating claims for incorporation of CIL. See id. at 733 n.21 (majority opinion).
The Court, however, rejected as one such factor whether international law recognizes universal
jurisdiction over the CIL norm advanced. See id. at 761-63 (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
252 For example, the relative weights of the factors guiding the analysis requires develop-
ment. Similarly, the type and amount of evidence that will establish congressional intent to
authorize common-law incorporation is uncertain. The historical and contemporary context of
the ATS was sufficient in Sosa. See id. at 712-24, 730-31 (majority opinion). But would, for
example, congressional enactment of a private right of action for CIL violations committed in
the United States provide sufficient proof of intent to authorize a common-law remedy for simi-
lar violations committed abroad? See Kim & Hreshchyshyn, supra note 200, at 34 (arguing that,
post-Sosa, Congress's creation of a private right of action for persons trafficked to the United
States might bolster the chance of a successful ATS claim by individuals trafficked outside the
United States). Many such questions remain.
253 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
254 See Cohen, supra note 26, at 287 ("[W]ith a dash of his pen, Justice Souter seems to
settle the long open question of whether the Senate can impose its own conditions in ratifying a
treaty."); John T. Parry, Progress and Justification in American Criminal Law, 40 TULSA L. REV.
639, 646 n.25 (2005) (noting analysis in the Sosa opinion "that seem[s] to indicate the Supreme
Court's acceptance of non-self-execution declarations"); Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 2283 (argu-
ing that the Supreme Court's "decision [in Sosa] to ignore the provisions of the ICCPR because
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siderations to CIL. In so doing, the Court emphasized Congress's pri-
macy in CIL incorporation.25 5 As noted above, the crux of the
minority position regarding CIL's domestic status was that federal
courts' authority to apply CIL as common law derives from the politi-
cal branches. While the Supreme Court did not adopt a rule that the
political branches must always confer common-law-making authority
expressly,2 56 the Court did endorse the minority position that federal
judicial power to incorporate CIL derives from political branch au-
thorization. Similarly, in identifying other considerations to guide the
incorporation analysis, the Court necessarily rejected the majority po-
sition that all CIL qualifies as federal common law, or even that all
specific and widely accepted norms of CIL qualify as federal common
law. 257 The Court thus rebuffed the academic majority position on the
domestic status of CIL.258
The Court cast doubt on scholarly international law commentary
in a more fundamental sense as well. Commentators have noted the
Supreme Court's inability to develop a coherent jurisprudence with
regard to international law. Decades ago, Louis Henkin stated that in
the area of foreign affairs "the cases are few; the Supreme Court does
not build and refine steadily case by case; it develops no expertise or
experts; [and] the [Jiustices have no clear philosophies."2 59 Although
cases touching on international law now reach the Court with greater
frequency, a view similar to Henkin's resurfaced in an assessment of
the Supreme Court Term in which Sosa was decided. John Setear as-
serts that the Supreme Court avoided recourse to international law in
the 2003 Term out of a discomfort with international law that arises in
part from the fact that "[t]he Court does not routinely wrestle with
it is understood to be non-self-executing is a careless expansion of a dubious doctrine"). But cf.
Halberstam, supra note 13, at 91-92, 95-107, 110-11 (challenging the constitutionality of attach-
ing non-self-execution declarations to otherwise self-executing treaties and arguing that Sosa's
uncritical acceptance of this practice "should not be considered dispositive").
255 For one commentator's defense of congressional primacy in incorporating CIL, see
Mark K. Moller, Old Puzzles, Puzzling Answers: The Alien Tort Statute and Federal Common
Law in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 2004 CATO Sup. CT. REV. 209, 222-31.
256 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714 (rejecting, based on "history and practice," Sosa's argument that
"there could be no claim for relief without a further statute expressly authorizing adoption of
causes of action").
257 See Young, supra note 1, at 457 ("[T]o the extent that post-Filartiga courts have applied
only a selective subset of customary international norms, those decisions do not support the
categorical position that all customary norms are federal law.").
258 As previously noted, the Sosa Court's rejection of the modern position is more fully
discussed in Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 27.
259 Louis Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM.
L. REV. 805, 831 (1964).
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international legal issues. ' 260 This Article suggests that skepticism
about the Court's ability to develop a coherent approach to interna-
tional law might begin to dissipate, at least with regard to the federal
status of international law. The Court has laid the groundwork for a
coherent doctrine governing the status of treaties and CIL in federal
courts, and the perceived avoidance of international law in Sosa re-
sults not from discomfort, but from adoption of that doctrine-a doc-
trine that restrains judicial incorporation as a result of separation of
powers concerns.
That doctrine not only creates a uniform analysis for treaties and
CIL, it coheres with other domestic tenets concerning international
law. In U.S. law, both treaties and CIL norms are subject to constitu-
tional restraints.261 For example, a U.S. court would not apply a treaty
provision that was inconsistent with the speech protections of the First
Amendment.262 The doctrine emerging from Sosa emphasizes that not
only do the individual rights guarantees of the Constitution limit fed-
eral court application of international law, but the structural provi-
sions of the Constitution do as well. 263 The federal courts' competence
to apply treaties and CIL is limited by the constitutional separation of
powers, which vests the political branches with primary authority to
conduct foreign affairs and to fashion domestic law through statutes
and treaties. That separation of powers is most forcefully protected
by the prominence of the political branches' intent in the emerging
analysis. The prominence of the political branches' intent in turn
comports with the notion that Congress and the executive can, under
260 John K. Setear, A Forest with No Trees: The Supreme Court and International Law in the
2003 Term, 91 VA. L. REV. 579, 669 (2005).
261 See United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 877 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 141(3) (1965)); Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1957) (Black, J., plurality opinion) ("[T]reaties and laws enacted
pursuant to them ... have to comply with the provisions of the Constitution."); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115(3) (1987).
262 See Vdzquez, supra note 12, at 718.
263 See id. at 695-96, 712-15, 722-23 (noting the separation of powers function served by
various iterations of the self-execution doctrine); Yoo, supra note 13, at 1961-62, 1966 & n.50
(likewise recognizing the separation of powers benefits secured by the self-execution doctrine).
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domestic law, violate CIL,264 and Congress can enact legislation that
trumps a prior treaty.265
Not only does the doctrine emerging from Sosa cohere with inter-
national law's domestic status more generally, it leads to more appro-
priate treatment of CIL and treaties in federal courts. The majority
view that CIL was federal common law applicable by federal courts
without congressional authorization led to the strange suggestion that
treaties-which are written, negotiated, and approved by the political
branches, and specifically mentioned in the Constitution as the su-
preme law of the land-could only be applied by federal courts if they
were self-executing, while norms of CIL-which are unwritten, amor-
phous, not specifically referenced in the Supremacy Clause, and only
indirectly controlled by the political branches-were automatically
applicable as federal common law. 266 Subjecting CIL norms to the
same analysis as treaties not only puts the two sources on the same
footing doctrinally, but likely means that treaties will qualify for appli-
cation in federal courts more easily than their more nebulous counter-
part, CIL. Whereas evidence of congressional authorization to
incorporate CIL norms must be sought outside these norms, treaties
provide their own evidence of political branch intent. As a result,
treaties may be more susceptible to application by federal courts than
norms of CIL under the uniform doctrine.
264 See Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 938-40 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (recognizing that Congress can enact laws inconsistent with principles of CIL); Garcia-Mir
v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453-55 (11th Cir.) (holding that Congress and at least high-level exec-
utive officials may act contrary to CIL), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 889 (1986); United States v. Ge-
orgescu, 723 F. Supp. 912, 921 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (recognizing that Congress can enact laws
inconsistent with principles of CIL); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 115(1)(a) & cmt. a, reporters' note 3 (1987) (noting Congress's author-
ity to enact laws that conflict with international law, and acknowledging authority suggesting
that the President may also exercise his constitutional authority in disregard of international
law).
265 See, e.g., Reid, 354 U.S. at 18 (noting that the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized
the last-in-time rule); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 115(1)(a) & cmt. a, reporters' note 1 (1987) (setting forth the last-in-time rule); Viz-
quez, supra note 12, at 696 (noting that, as a result of the last-in-time rule, "the legislature ulti-
mately has the power to control the judiciary's role in enforcing even self-executing treaties").
The President may also be able to disregard a treaty "when acting within his constitutional au-
thority." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 115 reporters' note 3 (1987).
266 Bradley & Goldsmith, CIL as Federal Common Law, supra note 4, at 858-59; cf. Moller,
supra note 255, at 224 ("It would make little sense for the Constitution to require agreement
between political branches-the executive and Senate-to ratify treaties, but to permit the judi-
ciary carte blanche to incorporate the customary law of nations domestically, without any assent
from either political branch.").
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One final implication of the doctrine arising from Sosa may not
seem as welcome. The doctrine might be perceived as hampering ef-
forts to incorporate and enforce international law domestically. 267 The
doctrine is certainly a step (or more) away from the majority position
that CIL is immediately applicable in federal courts as common law. 268
The practical-consequences consideration alone suggests that interna-
tional law may be least available through federal courts where advo-
cates feel it is most needed: that is, where it would change U.S.
practice. However, the perception that the doctrine undercuts inter-
national law enforcement largely results, it seems, from a reflexive
and narrow focus on the courts to accomplish legal goals. Sosa sug-
gests the need for a broader approach. In addition to pressing claims
appropriate for judicial incorporation, international law advocates
need to turn to Congress and treaty negotiators in the executive
branch to translate treaties and custom into domestic law. The effort
to do so may yield significant gains as incorporation through the polit-
267 Some have perceived Sosa as a setback for human rights litigation in the United States,
although the overall evaluation has been mixed. See, e.g., Berkowitz, supra note 26, at 290 (argu-
ing that "[t]he Sosa decision was a victory for human rights advocates because it affirmed a
private enforcement mechanism to encourage foreign parties to observe human rights overseas
and upheld the existence of a forum for victims to confront their abusers," though Sosa failed to
provide a sufficiently detailed and administrable standard for identifying common-law CIL
norms); Brower, supra note 200, at 940 (predicting that the limits the Supreme Court imposed on
judicial discretion to recognize new causes of action will make it harder to succeed in ATS litiga-
tion); Cohen, supra note 26, at 288, 321 ("Although Alvarez lost, the zigzagging opinion was
largely seen as a victory for ATS proponents and the international human rights community.");
Donald J. Kochan, No Longer Little Known but Now a Door Ajar: An Overview of the Evolving
and Dangerous Role of the Alien Tort Statute in Human Rights and International Law Jurispru-
dence, 8 CHAP. L. REV. 103, 104 (2005) (noting mixed evaluations of Sosa); Ochoa, supra note
26, at 640 (pointing out that Sosa "limited the scope of viable ATCA claims," but preserved "a
limited set of claims" that aliens may bring); Schneebaum, supra note 249, at 82-83 (rejecting
"the received wisdom" that Sosa "erects an impediment to activists' continuing use of interna-
tional human rights law" and arguing instead that Sosa produced an "'internationalist' opinion"
that "is likely ... to generate more, not less, effective enforcement of human rights norms in"
U.S. courts); Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 2246 ("[Hluman rights activists may consider [Sosa] a
victory in the sense that escaping a fire is a victory ... but the impact of the decision on future
litigation remains a matter of reasoned speculation."); Stephens, Corporate Liability, supra note
26, at 995, 1003 (arguing that the Sosa decision "delighted supporters of federal court human
rights litigation" because "the Court provided a cautious endorsement of the Fildrtiga doc-
trine"); Stephens, Human Rights Litigation, supra note 26, at 535 (noting that Sosa disappointed
those who saw federal courts' role under the ATS as either expansive or improper, but calling it
"a clear victory for those ... who view the statute as a means to hold the most egregious perpe-
trators accountable for the most egregious violations of international law").
268 This does not mean that support for the doctrine translates into opposition to, or dis-
taste for, international law. Kochan, supra note 267, at 109. The doctrine addresses the proper
procedure for incorporating international law into domestic law, not the value of substantive
international laws.
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ical branches serves to distill the charge that international law, like
judicial incorporation, suffers from a democratic deficit. 269 Political
branch incorporation similarly preserves the protection afforded by a
system of separation of powers.270
Conclusion
After decades of debate regarding the status of international law
in federal courts, a coherent resolution has begun to emerge. Though
unacknowledged by the Supreme Court and, prior to this Article, by
scholars, the recent opinion in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain suggests that
federal court application of the primary sources of international law-
treaties and custom-is governed by a uniform doctrine that assimi-
lates the considerations of self-execution. This development contra-
dicts the preponderance of academic wisdom on the subject but yields
a relatively straightforward symmetry of treatment for treaties and
CIL in federal courts that does not, like the majority position before
it, elevate custom over treaties, nor the courts over Congress.
269 See Bradley & Goldsmith, CIL as Federal Common Law, supra note 4, at 871 ("In the
long run,... . the requirement of political branch authorization may actually enhance the enforce-
ability of these norms. In general, CIL norms incorporated into federal statutes possess the
virtues of being clearer, more concrete, and more democratic than uncodified CIL. These char-
acteristics may alleviate concerns in this country about the legitimacy and content of these CIL
norms."); see also id. at 857-58 (discussing the incompatibility of treating CIL as federal com-
mon law with "American representative democracy"); Kochan, supra note 267, at 107 (noting
the democratic deficit in deriving CIL-based common law from nonbinding resolutions and in-
ternational instruments the political branches rejected); Young, supra note 1, at 398-400 (dis-
cussing the argument that incorporation of CIL as federal common law is undemocratic due to
both the discretion involved and the foreign source of CIL); Brav, supra note 26, at 276 (noting
arguments and counter-arguments regarding the democratic deficit in judicial incorporation of
CIL). But see Chander, supra note 201, at 1203 (invoking the thinking of John Hart Ely to argue
that the fluid transnational legal process undergirding international law is "a possible buttress
[rather than a rival] to democracy").
270 See David H. Moore, Setting the Record Straight: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the De-
bate over Customary International Law, in THE OTrrsouRcING OF AMERICAN LAW (forthcoming
2007) (manuscript at 18-19, on file with The George Washington Law Review).
